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CONTENTS

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RUSSIA INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

*Bakatin, Gumbaridze Criticize PFP *[MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA 21 Jun]* 1
*Russian Interests in European Stability Pondered *[SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA May]* 2
*Details on Foreign Trade Commission *[DELOVOY MIR 20 Jun]* 10
*Bulgaria, Tatarstan Sign Trade, S&T Agreements *[DELOVOY MIR 21 Jun]* 11
Fedorov Seen Changing Views After Belgrade *[MOSCOW NEWS 16-22 Jun]* 11
*Problems in Russian-French Trade, Economic Relations Viewed *[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 22 Jun]* 12
*Concern Over Influx of PRC Consumer Goods Deprecated *[DELOVOY MIR 16 Jun]* 14

RUSSIA NATIONAL AFFAIRS

Political Issues

*Yeltsin's, Chernomyrdin's Roles in Budennovsk Crisis Assessed *[MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS 20 Jun]* 15
Four Categories Created To Define Russian Political Parties *[SEGODNYA 1 Jun]* 17
*Need for Honesty in Politics Stressed *[DELOVOY MIR 24 Jun]* 19
*Poll Rates Leading Politicians for May *[NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 21 Jun]* 21
*Reliability, Methodology of Some Opinion Polls Critiqued *[SEGODNYA 1 Jun]* 28
*Decree Broadens Scope of Justice Ministry Activities *[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 9 Jun]* 30
Primakov Background, Ties, Views Profiled *[MOSCOW NEWS 16-22 Jun]* 31

Federal Assembly

*Decree, Statute on Committee for State Reserves 33
*Text of Decree *[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 21 Jun]* 33
*Text of Statute *[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 21 Jun]* 33

Regional Affairs

*Directive on Signing Treaty Delimiting Russia, Sakha Powers *[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 29 Jun]* 37
*RF Economic Measures for North Caucasus Region *[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 6 Jun]* 37
*Radioactive Waste Linked to Murmansk Oblast Deformities, Morbidity *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 23 Jun]* 38
*Construction of Kola AES-2 Planned *[MURMANSKIY VESTNIK 23 May]* 40
*Voronezh, Nizhniy Novgorod Living Standards Compared *[IZVESTIYA 28 Jun]* 40
'Right Bank' Opposition Movement Formed *[NIZHEGORODSKAYA PRAVDA 18 May]* 42

***Bakatin, Gumbaridze Criticize PFP**

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[Article by V. Bakatin and G. Gumbaridze: "Problems of Russia's Participation in NATO 'Partnership for Peace' Program (One Year After the Announcement of the 'Reform' Fund)"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Russian diplomacy has spent a whole year agonizing over a simple foreign economic choice—to participate or not to participate in NATO's "Partnership for Peace" program. Emotions either surged or subsided in response to numerous changes in the stance of the national leadership and its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ranging from the unconditional approval of the idea to its total rejection. The inconsistency and ambiguity of Russian policy in this specific case would not have seemed particularly surprising (as everyone has already grown accustomed to this) if it had not pertained to a matter of truly nationwide significance—the definition of the new Russia's role in the world community.

That is why the international "Reform" fund felt obliged last year to discourage Russia's involvement in the NATO program, precisely substantiating its position with the arguments that, first of all, the era of blocs and military groups was coming to an end, and that a genuine partnership of leading states for the sake of peace should be built on a fundamentally different basis; second, that Russia's role in safeguarding world security under the new geopolitical conditions should be defined by its intense efforts to eliminate the nuclear threat and promote universal disarmament and to design a new model of military-political interaction; and third, that participation in military blocs by Russia and the other post-socialist countries would do more to discourage than to promote their development of normal bilateral and multilateral relations with all of the countries of the world community during the difficult transition to a civilized market and economic integration.

It seemed that the futility of automatically retracing the steps that had been taken during the period of bloc confrontation and cold war should be obvious to the political leaders responsible for Russia's prestige and political influence in a changing world. What actually happened, however, was what usually happens when the foreign policy of one of the largest members of the world community is based on transitory considerations, and when a country's foreign policy voice occasionally shifts from the bass of a "great power" to the feeble tenor of a yes-man. Furthermore, it is off key in both cases and cannot be taken seriously by anyone. As a result, Russia's inclusion in the "Partnership for Peace" program on 31 May this year after numerous delays looked less like a carefully considered and important policy move than like just another diplomatic ploy, just another attempt to go with the flow in order to cover up a major foreign policy error. Many features of the process provide evidence of this.

In the beginning, for example, Russia missed the opportunity to initiate the creation of a fundamentally new, universal structure for the safeguarding of European and world security and order and to draft constructive proposals to reassess the role and place of the leading states in this process with a view to the changing political situation.

Later, the idea of the "Partnership for Peace" program as a supplement to the earlier defensive capabilities of the North Atlantic alliance of the period of East-West bloc confrontation was originally accepted without question by the Russian politicians. As more and more of the countries of the former Warsaw Pact, the Baltic states, and most of the CIS states joined the program, the changes in Russia's initial response gradually lost their relevance, and finally there was no chance that the authors of the program would take Russia's dissenting opinions into account.

Finally, the transformation of NATO's "Partnership for Peace" program into the cornerstone of the preemptive expansion of the alliance, by means of the inclusion of the states of Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic countries, became the kind of political reality Russia would be unable to influence, even when the specific stages of the process are being negotiated. None of the "tearful" arguments of the heads of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs against the expansion of NATO, suggesting that this could promote the return of a totalitarian Russia, of the GULAG, and so forth, could influence its "old" partners. The opposite is more likely: The pathetic arguments invoking the national-chauvinistic bogeyman can serve only as additional justification for NATO's policy of eastward expansion.

Under these conditions, the belated initiatives of Russia's foreign policy strategists with regard to the reform of NATO and the inclusion of this military bloc in the CSCE structure seem inappropriate. We should have learned some lessons from the East as soon as the "military-political" visits to Asian countries became the latest craze. As we know, the leaders there unequivocally rejected their Northern neighbor's improvisations on the theme of a regional collective security system and other such ideas. Membership in alliances of this kind is not in the interest of those countries. If the Russian political leaders had taken that stance, they probably

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the fact that in the past they were part of the USSR. The most important issues that Moscow is attempting to resolve with these states all arise from their former status as part of the Soviet Union, not as part of Europe. It is probably for that reason that Moscow usually regards them as an obstacle to its European policy, not as a field of that policy or at least a bridge it will have to cross to reach Europe.

Meanwhile their leaders, attempting to prevent Western Europe from focusing most of its attention on Russia, are trying to play the "Russian card" and frighten the West, often unsuccessfully, by emphasizing the incompatibility of Russian and Western civilization. The Council of Europe has admitted Estonia and Latvia, over Moscow's objections. Yet the Baltic countries have in effect blocked Russia's admission to that organization, using against it the dubious claim that it wants to reestablish its sphere of influence in the region. All three Baltic countries have become associate members of the West European Union and are already active in its structures. In the near future they will become associate members of the European Union. They plan to gain full NATO rights by the end of this century. In the race for European status Moscow is losing out to some of its former partners in the USSR.

Yet the shortsightedness and dilettantism of current Russian diplomacy, which is unable to foresee the long-range consequences of its actions, have nowhere been demonstrated so destructively as in the near European abroad. Attempting to be more democratic than the West itself and forgetting its own interests in its relations with the former Soviet republics, since August 1991 Moscow has tried to outdo all the rest in recognizing their independence. The pragmatic Czechs and Slovaks discussed and signed more than 70 agreements regulating their future relations before going their separate ways and acknowledging each other's sovereignty. During our own "divorce" our diplomats forgot to negotiate the future of the millions of Russians, the troops and the strategic installations stranded abroad, the fate of common property, etc. The consequences of that mistake have necessitated lengthy and arduous negotiations and will continue to be felt for a long time. The issue of who owns the nuclear weapons deployed in the territory of a number of republics was resolved in such an unprofessional manner that Washington had to intervene to prevent possible clashes and eliminate a problem that was poisoning Russian-Ukrainian relations. In 1991 Moscow still had means of influencing the former Soviet republics (they needed it to recognize their independence, and this would have made it possible to resolve many sensitive issues with substantial consideration for Russia's interests. Three years later that leverage no longer existed, and the dialogue was being conducted under conditions that were not to Russia's advantage. In order to achieve its objective Moscow was forced to resort to blackmail, threats and economic pressure, which did nothing to improve its relations with those countries. Once they realized that Russia was firmly "tied" to the West, they decided that from then on they could go through the West without entering into discussions with Moscow when they wanted to influence its policy in a direction favorable to them.

As a result Russia was not able to adequately ensure the friendliness of its immediate neighbors, i.e. of the states which in the western direction include two Slavic countries (with one-quarter of their population Russian). In the end it found itself surrounded by countries that are not very loyal to it and suspect that it intends to restrict their independent status (or are attempting to create that impression for their own domestic purposes). Moscow's claims to regard the post-Soviet space, which is still undergoing a process of national self-identification, as its influence zone and its sole responsibility, without clarification of what that might mean to others and without consideration for their interests, was hardly acceptable to them. In Ukraine, Moldova and the Baltic countries that kind of statement is often perceived as evidence of Moscow's hidden intention to exploit those countries' reported desire to reestablish some of their past economic relations in order to revive the Soviet empire, if not in its previous form then at least in its previous boundaries. Support for Zhirinovskiy and the communists by Russian voters in 1993, no matter how conditional it may seem today, merely served to reinforce suspicions on the part of the former "younger brothers" that their fears were justified. Moreover, such claims make the countries of the near abroad want to get guarantees of their security from outside forces (Kiev agreed to ship its nuclear weapons to Russia for disassembly only after Washington joined in the agreement; the same was true of Ukraine's signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; the Baltic countries look to NATO and the West European Union with longing). The anti-Russian potential of Europe's post-Soviet countries and their economic and political weakness could easily turn them into pawns in foreign forces' game over Russia and prompt them to pursue a balance-of-power policy with regard to Moscow (Z. Brzezinski's concept of "geopolitical pluralism").

It is clear that Russia's European policy will continue to go nowhere as long as arrogance and tension in its relations with its former Western neighbors — the former Soviet republics and the Warsaw Pact countries — persist, and as long as the main issues that feed their mutual suspicions are not eliminated. Under these conditions

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those countries will always be attempting to turn Western Europe against Russia in order to strengthen their own position and deny Russia the chance to use Western Europe to put pressure on them. It must be taken into account that psychologically European societies, in contrast to the political elite, usually favor small countries versus larger ones. However, the West does not want to be drawn into any squabbles between Moscow and its partners in the near abroad. All in all, each is undermining the other's chances for a closer interaction with Western Europe and its structures.

Russia can overcome this suspicion and ensure amicable relations with its immediate surroundings only by pursuing a policy which, while corresponding to its national interests, would also take into account the aspirations of those countries and, what is more, to a certain extent work for them. If Russia wants to have a status in the near abroad that places upon it major responsibility for the area's stability, it must realize that that situation will only become a reality if it is consciously accepted by Russia's partners. During the present transitional stage their national interest consists mainly of consolidating their independent status, and that desire takes precedence above all else, even the prosperity of their societies, not to mention processes of democratization and economic restructuring. In view of this, when Russia formulates its own national objectives (which will serve for others as an indication of the predictability of its behavior in the international arena) and methods of realizing them, it would do well to consider to what extent those objectives will affect the national interests of its immediate neighbors and how they will be interpreted. It must be borne in mind that small countries are more sensitive about such matters than medium-size or large countries. Russia must be able to sense the limits of its power, particularly in its relations with a small or weak state, and realize that pressure elicits not only concessions, but also hostility. This is also true in regard to relations with the Baltic countries, with their difficult history of coexistence with Russia, and with Ukraine, which has in effect never had its own state and therefore reacts very sensitively to any manifestations of Russian great power aspirations.

Russia's interaction with the rest of Europe is to a large extent physically possible today only through the territory of the near abroad, where are located the ports through which Russia can trade with the West, the pipelines by which it transports it oil and natural gas, the high-voltage transmission lines to Central and Eastern Europe, and the highways. Russia faces a serious dilemma today: either reorient all its lines of communication, supply routes and accesses to Europe by building new ports near St. Petersburg, Kaliningrad and Novorossiysk, in which case its ties with Europe will not depend on the political climate in the near European abroad; or else reach agreement with the new states regarding transit, leasing and joint ventures to operate existing lines of communication and supply. Naturally Moscow will have to pay for the use thereof. But that will still be cheaper than building new ones, and it will benefit the other countries as well. The second option is also preferable, firstly, because it will prompt Russia to have amicable relations with those countries, eliminating the potential for hostility from their side, and this will help the future status of Russia's positions in Europe. Secondly, the original sense of the two sides' forced dependence on each other will over time grow into an acceptable interdependence.

Virtually all the countries of the near European abroad would like to become part of a prosperous and increasingly integrated Greater Europe. In one form or another Russia desires the same thing. However, at the present time both processes are not only separate, they are in opposition to each other. In fact, the Baltic states' goal is not only to become part of NATO and then of the European Union, but also to prevent Russia from joining either one, pointing to a potential threat presented by it, at least for the foreseeable future. By doing so they are — wittingly or unwittingly —playing into the hands of those who hope to turn them into a new *cordon sanitaire*. Moscow, which continues to believe that it is strategically more important to the West than are its neighbors and sees their shortsighted, provincial games, is itself trying to behave the same way, attempting to prevent their inclusion in European structures.

However, this is not the only problem. Russian policy would demonstrate a great deal of farsightedness if, instead of competing with the near European abroad for first prize in Brussels, it would joined its own Europe-focused aspirations with similar aspirations on the part of its closest neighbors. Russia's entry into Europe should not occur at the cost of Europe spurning those neighbors, but instead through mutual aid and establishment of interaction, cooperation and some basis for integration in the process of progress toward the common goal. After all, it would be to Russia's benefit for its closest neighbors to accept European values and standards of behavior, as that would significantly facilitate the resolution of the difficult issues that arise in relations with them — the rights of ethnic minorities, the nuclear weapons issue and territorial claims. Moscow, for a long time now stuck in a mode of confrontation with the Baltic countries, Ukraine and Moldova, must move on to seek a positive basis for relations with those countries.

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The Middle and Far Abroad

Since there is essentially no foreign military threat to Russia along its western borders today and the geopolitical imperatives there are to a great extent being perceived in a new way, a substantial reorientation of Russian goals in that area will be necessary. It appears that the most immediate goals of Russian policy with regard to the European abroad, in addition to the removal of non-military security threats, will be to ensure those countries' goodwill and attract their resources (experience, technology, traditional ties, financial capability, existing security structures and intellectual commonality) to the process of our state's political and economic modernization. Clearly the long-range goal will be to become a part of the already unfolding process of European integration, and to join Greater Europe in one form or another. As it works to accomplish these goals, it is important for Russian diplomacy to rely on forces in the outside world that are in sympathy with these ideas and to block the actions of those who oppose them.

However, the concepts for a new European order that have emerged from the ruins of the Soviet empire and the socialist integrating structures (the Warsaw Pact and the CEMA) contain no new ideas regarding interaction between Russia and the countries of former Eastern Europe on new terms. Having closed the old era of relations with them, Moscow, despite its elaborate declarations, has not yet opened up a new one. Russia quickly lost its influence in the region, yielding it to Western Europe, Germany in particular. Furthermore, since the "velvet revolutions" and the failure of the Soviet experiment a chill, if not outright alienation, has been observed in those relations. To a certain extent this is mutual. Nor did it help that Russia has signed treaties of friendship and good-neighborliness, or cooperation, with a number of countries in the region (with Romania in April 1991, Poland in May 1992, Czecho-Slovakia in April 1992, and with Slovakia separately in August 1993).

The mutual rejection response was due to the recent past and reassessment of that past from a present-day standpoint. While many Eastern Europeans are convinced (sometimes rightly so) that the USSR mercilessly exploited them, Russian society is equally convinced that the loyalty of the "satellites" and their willingness to follow any Soviet peace initiatives, even the most senseless ones, came at too high a price. According to estimates made by Soviet economists and shared by their Western colleagues, Eastern Europe cost the USSR approximately $15 billion annually. Therefore when in the course of their "velvet revolutions" the Eastern Europeans began dismantling not only socialism but also their "indestructible friendship" with Moscow, the latter took advantage of this turn of events to free itself from the burden of its interdependence with the region. It scarcely needs to be added that this was done harshly, with no consideration for others' interests or tomorrow's needs. Moreover, Russia somehow managed to withdraw from the region in such a way that it found itself in debt to a majority of the countries located there (though this is probably more the fault of the Gorbachev government than of Russia).

Russian leaders pin their hopes for restructuring of the economic system, improvement in its social effectiveness and emergence of private enterprise and a market economy on interaction with the West, not with their former Soviet allies, from whom they feel they cannot draw any experience, or capital, or new technologies. The flip side of this position is the view of Russia held by politicians and economists in the region (i.e. Central and Eastern Europe), with the difference that they still hope to use Russia as a source of cheap raw materials (Russian gas accounts for 50 percent of Hungary's consumption, 68 percent in Poland, and 98 percent in the Czech Republic and Slovakia). The prevailing opinion is that from a standpoint of simple economic advantage it makes no sense for Russia to spend hard currency acquiring mediocre Eastern European products when it can buy better-quality items more cheaply on world markets. In turn, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe can also get everything they need there, without having to depend on the caprices of the Moscow establishment or on unforeseen zigzags in the situation in Russia. So what has happened is that suddenly Russia and its former Soviet partners in the Warsaw Pact and the CEMA no longer need each other when resolving their large-scale issues. True, this has disrupted existing economic ties and broken down cooperative supply relations and mutual obligations, idled factories and caused unemployment, but all these things were considered "trivial" in comparison with the grandiose schemes of the leaders of the "velvet" and "canvas" revolutions.

It soon became clear that not only did they not need each other, they actually got in each other's way. The universal and simultaneous reorientation of the post-socialist states toward the West intensified their competition for its favors, aid, loans and preferences. Among all the changes that have taken place in the post-socialist world, the West's grand prize is change in the former USSR, and its principal beneficiary is Russia.

Of course, the significance of the revolutions in Eastern Europe definitely should not be underestimated. Yet from the standpoint of the West and its security, the elimination of communism from a former nuclear superpower and the final outcome of that process are

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the most important. And so it was that objectively the West during the first stage paid more attention to Russia than to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The greater portion of its aid went to Russia, prompting those countries' dissatisfaction, directed more at Russia than at the West. The situation began to change in mid-1993, when difficulties began to emerge with economic and political reforms in Russia and with their progress in a number of countries in the region. The political risks in Russia proved to be too great, and therefore most private Western investment money went to other countries. For example, tiny Hungary receives substantially more than Russia does. And though the problem is mainly the unfavorable investment climate in Russia, it seems to many of her leaders that the Eastern European countries are intercepting this investment stream, leaving Russia less than she might otherwise expect. Some Moscow politicians believe that the former Soviet "satellites" are intentionally undermining Russia's image in the eyes of the West for their own egotistical purposes.

All this creates an atmosphere in which reevaluation of the past and establishment of cooperation on a new basis run into significant difficulties. Reasonable politicians on both sides are aware of the abnormality of a situation in which opportunities are being missed, even though they stem from the common problems faced by all the post-socialist states. However, the current state of affairs prevails, and timid appeals and attempts to rectify the situation bring no significant change.

On the whole, Central and Eastern Europe do not currently feel any military threat. The primary perceived threats to their security are domestic social and political instability, crime-related tension, growing unemployment and the sudden segmentation of society. Foreign security threats are, in the opinion of the region's politicians and experts, mainly non-military in nature. These include the threat of more Chernobyls and environmental disasters, the possibility of mass migration from the East, and the integration of mafia structures in the post-socialist world with those in Western Europe. Among the external threats, serious concern is caused by the ethnic conflicts that have flared up in the post-Soviet space and in the Balkans. Moscow's domestic war in Chechnya quickly revealed the parameters of the threats it presents to the countries around it: involvement in a conflict through mercenary activity and arms shipments by other countries, violations of human rights and constitutional liberties and the need to respond to these, militarization of the country and an expanded role for the force structures, division in society accompanied by greater political instability and separatism, growing nationalism and chauvinism, an upsurge in terrorism, including at the international level, and so on.

However, the leaders of countries in the region see the greatest potential threat to their security in the instability and uncertainty of the political situation in Russia, the unpredictability of its development, the lack of civilian control over force structures, and the reemergence of imperialist tendencies in political thinking in Moscow, which is unable to establish order in its own house yet lays claim to special rights in the post-Soviet space. The fear of these states, particularly Poland and Hungary, is also based on historical memory, refreshed by the musings of some Russian politicians about the benefits of something like a "Monroe Doctrine" for the post-socialist world. Hence the feeling that there is a need to have some kind of guarantees of their own survival, their territorial integrity and the opportunity to run their lives as they see fit. This sentiment intensified markedly, reaching the level of hysteria, following the events of October 1993, Zhirinovskiy's breakthrough into the State Duma and the shelling of Groznyy. Not about to rely on themselves alone and apparently not very trustful of each other, the political elites of the Eastern European countries would like to obtain those guarantees from NATO.

Objectively speaking, an unstable Russia with foreign policy shifts from one extreme to the other (either selfless fawning over the West, or else claims to a veto over its decisions) and the great-power nostalgia of right-wing and left-wing radicals cannot help but cause Russia's neighbors concern. However, the question is how to remove that concern without inciting hysterical alarmism on either side. In fact, almost none of the post-communist societies in transition are notable for their stability or predictability. Ukraine is hardly any more stable than Russia; who knows how Hungary would react if Hungarians were to be expelled from Transylvania, Voevodina or Slovakia; or Poland, if the Germans in Silesia wanted to reunite with Germany. In the applications for immediate NATO membership there is, in addition to sincere alarm, also an element of political gamesmanship, taking advantage of the current situation to frighten the West with a "new Russian threat" in order to become part of the West faster. The "Vyshegrad Four" do not in fact need NATO as much as they need the European Union, with its achievements and its regional aid programs to backward countries, all the things the East Germans hoped to obtain when they rushed into reunification. Many politicians in Central and Eastern Europe regard NATO membership as a first step toward membership in the European Union.

The above also applies to the other side. The hysteria incited over this issue by the Russian military, the Foreign Intelligence Service and then the MFA most likely reflect not sober analysis, but rather the mindset

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of the Russian man on the street: things are bad for me, so why should they be better for anyone else? After all, what is so tragic about the Eastern European countries joining NATO? The fact that NATO will advance to Russia's borders along a small section of Kaliningrad Oblast? But Russia has adjoined NATO since 1949 in the northern part of the Kola Peninsula and on the Baltic Sea, and the USSR bordered the bloc for 45 years (in the same areas, as well as in the Transcaucasus and Black Sea regions), and its troops served in NATO territory for three years. Russia itself intends to make friends with and develop cooperation with NATO, exchange plans of military operations with the bloc, conduct joint maneuvers and perhaps even have joint peacekeeping forces. In that case, the closer NATO is to Russia, the easier it will be to carry out all those intentions. Maybe NATO could even be lured into a peacekeeping mission in Tajikistan or Nagorno-Karabakh, but that is too tempting to ever become reality. As for the argument about the colossal cost of redeploying troops "in connection with new threats," those should actually be chalked up under the heading "Disintegration of the USSR" rather than "Devious Western Plots" (in Chechnya those same force structures gave no thought to the expense). By the same token, once the Eastern European countries are in NATO they might overcome their inferiority complex, feel more confident and be able to go much farther toward meeting Russia halfway than they are currently prepared to do. Therefore it makes little sense to allocate Russia's limited resources just to joust with windmills.

It is often claimed that NATO, by taking in the former Warsaw Pact countries without Russia, will be objectively directly against Russia, or that in any case there will be grounds for that interpretation. A selective approach to NATO membership, no matter how justified, revives Cold War ideology and could result in a new division of Europe. Russia, rejected by the West and left alone to face its difficult domestic problems and its hostile surroundings, has a greater chance of turning to authoritarianism and imperialist thinking. While this possibility should not be ignored in principle, it should also be borne in mind that it is virtually impossible to isolate Russia from the outside world, even if Russia itself wanted to do so. Everything that is occurring there is of too much importance to the rest of the world, and the world cannot shut itself off from the processes that are occurring in Russia, even if it were to build a new Great Wall of China.

The structure of international relations cannot be monopolar; with just one support it would be too unstable. The world community, even if it abides by a common system of values, needs an alternative for development and political orientation. There is the problem of choice, and hence the nostalgia among a significant part of the West for the now-defunct superstate. It, i.e. that part, hopes that Russia, after critically assimilating the USSR's international experience and passing through the crucible of reform, might become an inseparable part not only of the European but also of the worldwide balance. An *a priori* perception of NATO as an opponent (back in November 1990 NATO and the Warsaw Pact jointly stated that they no longer regarded each other as enemies) is also the product of confrontational thinking.

However, assessing the situation realistically one must admit that Russia has little chance of becoming a NATO member in the foreseeable future. The West does not want that, because it does not want to burden itself with Russia's internal problems and because it does not want to be drawn into Moscow's squabbles with its neighbors. Nor do the political leaders of the Eastern European countries want that, because if Russia were to join the alliance they might find themselves relegated to a third- or fourth-place role. Finally, Russia's military commanders and military-industrial complex do not want that, because they are rightly afraid that this would inevitably result in democratization of the army and its transparency, to establishment of civilian control over it, or at least over its budget, and to restriction of the privileges that the generals now enjoy in unlimited fashion. It is not surprising that top Russian military leaders have been so zealously opposed to the Partnership for Peace framework agreement, which contains all these criteria, preferring a specific program of military cooperation with the bloc that will not affect general principles. The former is regarded as a paper formality, the latter as a guide for action. In view of the existing realities, the solution could be to have the military aspect of European security rest on two pillars, i.e. NATO and Russia, with close cooperation between them on a number of issues, both military and political. This bilateral interaction could be formalized in a treaty on partnership and cooperation between Russia and NATO in the security realm through which Russia would be tied in with the bloc, bringing with it the collective security system that is emerging in the post-Soviet space. At the same time, Russia could demand a certain price for the admission of the Central and Eastern European countries to it, a price based on certain risks to its security (as was done in the case of German reunification). It is important that this price not be too high and not be insulting either to the Eastern European countries or to the West.

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Meanwhile the middle abroad is gradually moving into one of the least important positions in Russia's system of foreign policy priorities. Thus far there are no signs that there will be any decisive turn for the better in their relations in the foreseeable future. In December 1994 A. Kozyrev refused to sign a protocol regarding specific cooperation within the framework of the Partnership for Peace, thereby signalling Moscow's intention to do everything possible to prevent admission of countries in the region to NATO. However, two factors could create the proper conditions for overcoming the impasse in this area of foreign policy. The first is to realize that Russia's path to Greater Europe passes through the middle abroad, and that for that reason it is important that it not be an obstacle on that path, but rather a friendly partner. Of course, there are in those countries certain forces that wish to lock Russia up in Asia. However, Moscow could block their influence by opening up a frank dialogue with them on central rather than peripheral issues, issues that are the subject of mutual concern. The second is to convey to countries in the region, especially those that have made the breakthrough, that Moscow is prepared to support their more active participation in solving their own problems, particularly economic ones, and to emulate their political and economic experience gained under similar circumstances yet ahead of Russia's own. This kind of presence, capable of influencing the course of events in our country, could alleviate their current fears with regard to Russia.

The desire that is evidenced from time to time by a number of post-socialist countries (particularly those that have overcome their economic decline) to restore some economic relations that were destroyed by the disintegration of the CEMA and the USSR could stimulate the development of center-oriented tendencies in this area of Europe, but on a new basis. Russia could become their locomotive, but keeping in mind that, firstly, it will be much more difficult to do so two or three years from now, if it is still possible at all, and that, secondly, any claims on its part to dominate its partners, who have only recently gained their independence, would spoil the newly-created opportunities.

Today Russia finds itself surrounded by an almost completely hostile environment. On whom can she rely in her search for and performance of a new international role? There is no doubt that that role, as one of historical succession, must be defined and accepted by Russia on the basis of her present national democratic consciousness. It must not reflect the aspirations of a single party, even a victorious one, or be injected from without. As in any civilized country, Russia must find an interparty consensus on the principal aspects of its foreign policy course.

The West's Dilemma

In a world that is undergoing radical renewal, when the main source of conflict in it is increasingly between different civilizations, Russia's geopolitical function will clearly be to buffer excessive pressure between East and West, preventing their competition from progressing to extreme forms (in terms of civilization, not geography or politics).

To a certain extent that role reflects the historic tradition of the Russian state, one that it inherited from the Byzantine Empire, which also existed at the crossroads of two civilizations. Ancient Rus, by casting its future under the feet of the Tatar horsemen, spent its lives and territorial expanses saving the rest of Europe (both Western and Eastern) from those horsemen and allowing it to enter the Age of Enlightenment, which was to determine its future. True, as a result Rus found itself almost three centuries behind in its development, having lost its link with the emerging Western civilization. In some cases even the former Soviet Union attempted to play this role (in the Arab-Israeli conflict, for example). In the eyes of Russian society, Serbia's struggle against the Muslims in Bosnia, like Bulgaria's struggle against Turkey in the last century, is perceived as the fulfillment of a similar mission, though on a different scale. Hence the sympathy for these struggles.

Incidentally, this geopolitical function could be performed in at least two different ways. The first is to absorb the main blow or the main burden ourselves. This is the most acceptable to outside forces, and the least acceptable to Russia, as it requires her to be totally focused on herself and makes it necessary to mobilize all the resources of society and the state to perform that role, paving the way for authoritarianism or totalitarianism. The second is to perform this function in the form of a vanguard, in cooperation or interaction with other countries and power centers, with a constant sense of a secure rear and support, ideally with that support coming from both sides. It seems that this option would best suit Russia. It is clear that in doing so Russia would not be able to count on Ukraine, the Baltic countries or Central and Eastern Europe: they do not have the necessary resources for this, and are not likely to be interested in Russia's special status in the Eurasian space. And if they did agree to that option, then only with a long-range objective, counting on this burden keeping Russia down for a long time to come. The United States is too far away and too absorbed in the problems of the Asia-Pacific region to adequately perceive the geopolitical realities of Eurasia. But Western Europe, aware that its security and continuation of its current cycle of prosperity are directly dependent on what form Russia will take in a changing world, understands that Russia

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will need outside support in order to perform its geopolitical mission.

However, despite all the overlapping of geopolitical imperatives, this new interaction between Russia and Western Europe is developing with significant unknowns, and this will definitely be reflected in its nature and forms. The problem is not just unpredictability or dangerous tendencies in the development of the Russian situation, it is also that Western Europe is encountering a number of dilemmas in its approach to Russia, dilemmas that it has been attempting to resolve for the last three hundred years and that now loom once again.

The first of these comes down to a question: what is better for Europe, to have Russia in it, or outside it? It cannot be said that Western European leaders today have an unambiguous answer to that question. In their opinion, the following factors favor the inclusion of Russia in Europe:

— greater ability to influence its development, the process of modernization and the inculcation of Western values, democracy and a market economy in a way that will be in their own interest;

— the prospect of creating a huge market space in which the European Union, thanks to its economic, financial and technological might, could dominate, and which could become a pivotal point of the world economy and a counterweight to the other regional association made up of the Asia-Pacific region and North America;

— the ability to influence the other post-Soviet states through Russia in their own interest;

— the emergence of the proper conditions for resolving European security issues on a new political basis, assuming that wars do not happen between modern democracies, and precluding the possibility of more Yugoslavias and Chechnyas;

— use of Russia as a counterweight to Germany's increasing influence on the continent, something that has caused concern among Germany's EU partners.

In addition to the favorable opportunities offered by the long-range perspective, in the opinion of a number of European leaders Russia's entry into Europe is fraught with significant drawbacks or outright dangers. These objections are usually formulated as follows:

— Russia is so large and multifaceted that there is the danger that the West would not have a dominant effect on Russia, but rather vice versa; that in the end the West would not change it, but be changed by it;

— Russia's current political and economic instability are so great that the cost of its stabilization and modernization would prove unbearable to Western Europe (in this respect experience with German reunification points to the need for caution), which would not be able to assume the burden of even part of Russia's internal problems without undermining its own international positions;

— Western Europe might inevitably become drawn into the ethnic and political conflicts that are erupting along the perimeter of Russia's borders and inside the country; the Yugoslavian crisis has demonstrated European structures' limited abilities in this regard, and the Chechen tragedy has illustrated the sort of debacle in which they might become entangled;

— like Great Britain in the past, today's Russia might be hampered by its strategic partnership with the United States, which will attempt to draw Russia into its global games, the result of which could be constant competition between the Western allies for influence over Moscow.

The most eager to postpone any decision about admitting Russia to Greater Europe are not only the Eastern Europe countries, but also some smaller Western European ones. Their leaders assert that Russia is a civilization that is alien in spirit to the West, that expectations of its renewal are overly inflated, and that it will take too much from Europe while giving too little in return.

Yet many Western politicians also understand that distancing themselves from Russia is fraught with equally unpleasant consequences for Europe. An isolated Russia will view Western Europe as a sidelines observer, not a partner, mutual alienation will inevitably cause tension in their relations, and Russia will once again be perceived as a threat to the West. Left to its own devices and without sufficient Western influence, it will either explode in such a way that the effects of the explosion will affect all of Europe, or it will turn toward definitely "unenlightened" authoritarianism, ending the process of democratization and movement toward a market economy.

Another dilemma faced by the Western European elite comes down to a simple question: what kind of new Russia do it want to see, a strong one or a weak one?

It would be easier to incorporate a weak Russia into Europe, because by its very nature it would not challenge the others, and it would be no threat and more likely an obedient partner. It would be easier to manipulate and would be largely dependent on handouts from the West. On the other hand, a weak Russia would become a permanent dependent and it would have to be "fed" or even kept afloat, and that would not be cheap. A weak Russia would not only be unable to cope with the internal virus of nationalism, it would also infect the rest of

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Europe with it, particularly Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans.

A strong but friendly Russia with close ties to the West would be able to deal with its problems on its own without shifting them to its partners, and it would be able to lead the huge post-Soviet world and prevent a shift toward Islamic fundamentalism in the Muslim republics. Of course, much will depend on what the basis of its strength will be. And there is another consideration of equal importance: would a strong Russia be sufficiently obedient to act in Western Europe's interests? Would a strong Russia not force the West to serve its own objectives?

Western Europe's third dilemma concerns the problem of including Russia in its current structures. One reason that the West had an easier time weathering the changes brought on by the end of the Cold War was that its integrating structures continued to function, though with some disruption. These structures, created on the basis of common values and standards of behavior, eased the Western countries' coordinated transition to a new dimension without causing serious friction between them. The non-democratic integrating structures of the communist world — the USSR, Yugoslavia, the Warsaw Pact and the CEMA — collapsed overnight, and the absence of mechanisms for interaction made a civilized transition to a new state and the conjunction of old partners' new interests more difficult. Therefore it also would seem logical from the standpoint of faster adaptation to include Russia and possibly the countries around it in the integrating structures that are already functioning in Western Europe. But that inclusion will inevitably cause them either serious tension due to the heterogeneity of their components, or else sharply decrease their effectiveness, as has happened with the OSCE. One possible solution to this problem could be to find specific forms for such inclusion. Some steps have already been taken in that direction. An Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation with the EU has been concluded and Russia is now present on the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and has signed on to NATO's Partnership for Peace program. However, so far this is only the periphery of European structures and is inadequate to the potential opportunities for interaction between Russia and Western Europe, and therefore cannot satisfy Moscow. In fact, for the Eastern Europeans the Partnership for Peace is a preparatory class for admission to NATO and the EU. For Russia, diverse and both powerful and weak at the same time, there is always the risk of remaining forever a student in that class. Therefore it needs to seek its own field of interaction both with NATO and with Europe as a whole.

* * *

An awareness of Russia's "ego" in the new world (and European) order must take all these aspects into account. Even major powers like the United States and Japan, concerned with reinforcing their international influence, are seeking ways of integrating with this space that adjoins them. Moscow cannot enter Europe by interacting only with its Western part and leapfrogging over all that lies between them. Only Russian reliance on the entire amicable European abroad, if it can see in Russia a favorable and reliable partner, will create a firm foundation for its self-affirmation in a changing world.

***Details on Foreign Trade Commission**

954Q0230A Moscow DELOVOY MIR in Russian 20 Jun 95 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Rara Avis on Foreign Economic Commission"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The government offensive against exporters and importers continues. Exporters now face some serious difficulties associated with the unexpected turn in the policy of the Central Bank. The dollar is steadily falling, lowering the effectiveness of operations, but, at the same time, strange as it is, overhead expenses, determined in rubles, are going up. The importers, in turn, are facing a marketing crisis in connection with the proposed increase in import duties. It would appear that it is time to protect importers and exporters from the government, but quite on the contrary, a special decree created the Russian Federation commission for protectionist measures in foreign trade.

The most commonly used word in the statute on the commission is "investigation" as if the matter concerns some purely criminal element. Subject to investigation will be cases where "substantial harm is done to domestic production or where there is a threat of such harm in connection with lowering of prices through dumping, use of subsidies in production or export, expanded imports..." The targets for its checks, by the way, are selected by the commission itself, and God only knows what will attract its attention. On the basis of results produced by the "investigations," the commission will introduce "restrictions (import quotas), special antidumping and compensatory duties," etc.

The "foreign economic tribunal" includes 12 heads of agencies from the Antimonopoly Committee to the Federal Security Service. The new control organ will be chaired by Oleg Davydov, deputy chairman of the government. Only the 13th member of the commission,

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Mr. Andrey Glagovskiy, has any connection with the business hierarchy. In the list he appears as a member of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy of the MVES [Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations] of Russia. Andrey Mikhyalovich, however, is far better known as the general director of the Menatep-impeks Company engaged in international trading and investment activity. In that manner among the government employees, who will be resolving the fate of various foreign economic projects, there is also a practical businessman who will undoubtedly ensure that the commission will not engage in any extremism. It is unfortunate that Russia business is represented in the state commission by just a single person.

•Bulgaria, Tatarstan Sign Trade, S&T Agreements

954Q0230B Moscow DELOVOY MIR in Russian 21 Jun 95 p 7

[Article by I. Zakirov: "Bulgaria Got Closer"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The government delegation of Tatarstan, led by Farid Mukhametshin, prime minister of the republic, was in Bulgaria on an official visit. As expected, while in Sofia Farid Mukhametshin and Kiril Tsochev, the deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Trade and Foreign Economic Cooperation, signed an agreement on trade and economic and scientific-technical cooperation. As noted at the press conference on the results of the visit, the agreement pursues the goal of taking the developing business ties between the two republics to a qualitatively new level. The parties pledged to ensure the most favored nation treatment in entrepreneurial or other economic activity while promoting creation of joint ventures, the exchange of economic and scientific-technical information, and creating favorable conditions for investments.

A protocol of intentions was attached to the agreement designating various projects in the sale of goods for mutual delivery. Tatarstan intends to export chemical products, petroleum products, plastics, rubber, trucks and spare parts for them, watches, electrical appliances, mineral fertilizers, and consumer goods.

The list of goods for import from Bulgaria includes canned food, fresh fruit and vegetables, electric and engine loaders and spare parts for them, furniture and household goods, perfume and toiletries, medicine, cigarettes and raw and other material for their production, and beverages with low and high alcoholic content.

The share of Bulgaria in the overall volume of commodity turnover of Tatarstan with foreign countries comes to 5 percent. This so far insignificant volume indicates that reserves still exist. The task consists of utilizing them with maximum benefit for each of the parties. The creation of a number of joint ventures was the result of cooperation with partners from Bulgaria. On 1 May of this year, four joint ventures were registered in Tatarstan with participation of Bulgarian capital, the total statutory fund of which amounts to around 4 billion rubles. The joint ventures are engaged in the implementation of control and measurement devices for technological processes, production of consumer goods and building materials, as well as processing and sale of industrial, agricultural, and culinary products on both the domestic and foreign markets.

In connection with the Sofia agreement observers are noting increased efforts by the government of Tatarstan in the field of foreign economic activity. After all, just a week earlier a similar agreement between Tatarstan and Turkey was signed in Ankara.

As declared at the press conference in Kazan by Farid Mukhametshin, the principal value of intergovernmental agreements with countries of the far abroad is the prospect of prolonged cooperation. In the state program of economic and social progress in Tatarstan being worked out today, considerable attention will be devoted to the foreign economic activity of the republic.

Fedorov Seen Changing Views After Belgrade

954F2672A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English 16-22 Jun 95 No 23, p 2

[Article by Pavel Kandel: "Boris Fyodorov Playing the Patriot"; first paragraph is introductory paragraph]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Even the most liberal Russian politicians are beginning to sound slightly pro-Serbian after a trip to Belgrade. Boris Fyodorov is the latest such case.

There is nothing unusual about a Russian politician changing his stripes. But what an incredible effect the word "derzhava," or state power, has on them.

The visit of the leader of "Forward, Russia!" to Serbia resulted in several discoveries. It appears that there actually were not any "legitimate, historical borders" inside the former Yugoslavian state. And where and when have borders ever existed? Does not Fyodorov understand who started this discussion on "the legitimate and historical borders," and for what purpose? And does he not know how such discussions used to end? One has only to visit Abkhazia, Ingushetia and Chechnya to answer these questions. Fyodorov has also learned that Yugoslavian soldiers do not wage war in Bosnia and

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Croatia and that Yugoslavia does not "officially" deliver any arms there. In fact, after capturing one-third of Croatia and two-thirds of Bosnia the Yugoslavian army "officially" left these territories. However, a number of enigmas remain: whose shells and rockets are falling on Sarajevo or Zagreb? There is one more weird point here. Belgrade "officially" broke with the Bosnian Serbs. Nevertheless, it is to Belgrade where politicians go to settle the problem of peacekeepers taken prisoner by the Bosnian Serbs. I would illustrate this with an instructive example: Armenia and Azerbaijan did not "officially" fight in Karabakh but Yerevan and Baku are conducting the peace talks.

It gets even better. Fyodorov has come to the conclusion that Yugoslavia is mistakenly being pictured as a "bastion of communism, stagnation and reaction" because it successfully stabilized the dinar. A trenchant argument in any case. However, I would like to point out that even in socialist Yugoslavia — on the eve of its collapse — financial stabilization was attained. The dinar did not stand long. The fact that Ante Marcovic, then prime minister, a Croat and an incorrigible member of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, infuriated the authorities in Belgrade was one of the reasons for it. This resembles the situation in Russia where titanic efforts aimed at economic stabilization were more than once sacrificed to political games.

However, there are some points where Fyodorov is certainly right. The present Yugoslavian leadership consists of "apparatchiks" and is authoritarian in its methods. Nevertheless it would not be right to call Slobodan Milosevic a communist. From the very beginning of his political career as secretary of the Belgrade City League of Communists, he diligently served the idea of Greater Serbia. The consequences are obvious. The bomb that smashed the multinational federal state was prepared as a mixture of Greater Serbianism, and of Croat and Slav separatism.

It is also true that there is a lot in common in the problems that both Russia and Yugoslavia face in their "near abroad." Russia after 1991 managed to escape balkanization. However, it wouldn't be difficult to turn Ukraine into another Croatia and Kazakhstan into another Bosnia. Yet to cite Yugoslavia as an example for Russia — as inevitably follows from the above — would be to invoke the Yugoslavian scenario. The one who does this must be longing to reap Zhirinovsky's laurels or the votes of his present supporters.

***Problems in Russian-French Trade, Economic Relations Viewed**

954E1127A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 22 Jun 95 p 6

[Article by Nikolay Paklin, ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA correspondent in Paris: "Trade Window to Europe; What Fate Awaits the Russian Trade Representations"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "It is some kind of nonsense," shrugs Viktor Nikolayevich Yaroshenko, the trade representative of the RF [Russian Federation] in France. "The French customs services record the import of Russian goods into France in the amount of almost a billion dollars a year more than pass over the Russian border according to the data of Goskomstat [State Committee on Statistics]. There is no reason to doubt the reliability of the French data: In France the customs service has long operated as a well-regulated mechanism. Rather, the conclusion which most likely suggests itself is the following: These goods are evidently leaving our country without the proper customs and other "formalities," i.e., in fact as contraband. This may mean that their owners are not paying customs duties and other taxes, and the export revenues are not returning to our country.

We cannot exclude the possibility that our goods first go to states neighboring Russia—the former Soviet socialist republics—and from there to France. Evidently, such a roundabout path brings considerable profit to their owners and turns out to be shorter for the purpose of extracting super-profits.

[Correspondent] And why are you inclined toward such a "working hypothesis?"

[Yaroshenko] "In recent times, we have encountered on the French market competition for Russian goods... by other Russian goods. The latter are exported to France from these same countries neighboring Russia. They get goods from us as technical credits or even as humanitarian aid, and then sell them abroad at dumping prices. Such "business" is practiced, specifically, by the Baltic countries, Ukraine and Georgia. It happens that aluminum bearing the markings of the same Russian plant (for example, the Bratsk Aluminum Plant) is sold in France by Russian and by Lithuanian firms. The situation is the same with copper. Russia has become like a huge unguarded warehouse: During the day they stock it, and at night they pilfer..."

The trade representative's concern is quite understandable: Russian-French economic relations, which had taken a rapid start, have come to a standstill. One of the reasons inhibiting Russian-French economic relations is the protectionist policy of the French state. It protects its

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market, guarding it against competitors. Today in France there is a more centralized economy than even in Russia. France has set limits on deliveries of our nuclear fuel, steel and textiles. These limitations are justified by the decisions of the European Union. And it turns out that, just as we used to sell primarily raw materials and power resources to France in the past, so we continue to do so. As before, we are supplying France with a billion dollars worth of natural gas, around 6 million tonnes of oil and petroleum products, and various ores and metals.

"Yet the structure of French export to Russia has undergone significant changes, and certainly not for the better for us," says Viktor Yaroshenko. "We have begun to buy many more luxury items and ready-made clothing and foodstuffs than before. Yet we are importing not only meat and butter, but also beer and wine, and even... mineral water. And for all this we must pay much more than before. When we had a monopoly on foreign trade, a single buyer made purchases on the French market. Today there is an innumerable multitude of them. They compete with each other, to the delight of the French traders, who hike up the prices. And it is our consumers who pay. As for the credits which France gives us, there are now much fewer of them, and they are granted on less favorable conditions."

Russian enterprises have established over 20 joint-stock companies in France. However, they operate as middlemen, providing banking, insurance and transport-expediting services. In the sphere of production there is only one example for the present time: The joint-stock company "SOGO," which has acquired a perfume factory. Its production goes primarily to the Russian market. "But French capital is also not rushing into the sphere of production in Russia," notes Viktor Yaroshenko. "They too prefer the sphere of services: Middleman operations, retail trade, finance, and engineering. It is true, there are other examples as well, although they are singular. Thus, a European furniture company is building a large furniture factory in our company, and the 'L'Oreal' company has established a limited partnership at the Biryulevskiy Household Chemical Plant for production of shampoo, hair spray, etc."

French entrepreneurs are frightened away by the instability of our economy, the ever-changing legislative base regulating foreign economic activity, the tax confusion, and also the tense criminal situation in Russia.

There are, however, other reasons as well. Previously, foreign trade was conducted primarily with the aid of the trade representations. Today the situation has changed. The repeal of the monopoly on foreign trade and the transition to market relations in our country have significantly altered the functions of the trade representations. Before, orders were placed through our trade representations abroad. They were answerable to the foreign trade department. Now the trade representation no longer engages directly in trade. This has prompted certain reformers even to pose the question of closing the trade representations as such, handing over their functions to the economic departments of the embassies. However, another, more realistic, point of view prevails: For the transitional period, trade representations are needed in the large countries, and in the small ones we should change over to regional servicing, which, we might add, has already been done in a number of regions (Africa, Latin America).

"Of course, the functions of the trade representation have changed," states Viktor Yaroshenko. "At the present time, our primary task is to create the most favorable conditions for Russian exporters and importers, and for investors. For this, we study the trade-political conditions in France, focusing particular attention on the methods of state regulation of foreign economic activity. We analyze the economic market conditions and give our recommendations on the most promising directions for development of trade-economic relations. The trade representation facilitates the clearing of "bottlenecks" in Russian-French economic relations. Specifically, it actively participates in the resolution of questions associated with issuance and repayment of previously granted credits, and provides aid in the implementation of major projects of all-state significance on the territory of Russia. We collect valuable information on the financial position of French companies acting as our partners. If our businessmen want to know whom they are dealing with, let them come to us. We also call upon the Russian regions which have decided to enter the French market to utilize our services."

The market relations which Russia is entering are like a jungle, but with trodden paths. We must know these paths well, so as not to fall into a trap. The Russian state, like the French, like any other, is called upon to protect and defend the interests of Russian business. Here is but one example: Because of anti-dumping legislation in the European Union, our exporters lose $2-$3 billion annually. Yet in many countries this legislation is used as a means for protecting the domestic market against competitors. Who must make the breaches in these barriers? The state and its authorized representatives, including the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and the trade representations. Of course, we must live within our means. However, we must also use our head

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in abolishing and rebuilding. After all, we have already chopped more than enough firewood.

***Concern Over Influx of PRC Consumer Goods Deprecated**

954Q0223A Moscow DELOVOY MIR in Russian 16 Jun 95 p 7

[Article by Aleksandr Stushnov, DELOVOY MIR correspondent: "Russia-PRC: Cheap Imports for the Time Being"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A session of the Russian-Chinese Intergovernmental Commission that concluded yesterday noted a decline in the volume of trade between Russia and the PRC, a continuation of the 1994 trend. However, neither side was inclined to dramatize this situation, believing that there are fully objective reasons for this stemming from the economic reforms underway both in Russia and in China.

Indeed, the bilateral intergovernmental agreement to begin keeping accounts in convertible currency at a time when both countries are experiencing a shortage of hard currency could have been expected to be reflected in the dynamics of trade. An important role was also played by measures taken by both China and Russia to restrict exports of poor-quality products to the Russian Federation. As Russian minister of foreign affairs A. Kozyrev noted during a visit to China in March, "the time of cheap goods is over, and therefore there has been some quantitative decrease. Now the problem is to reach a level that is civilized and worthy of the current state of bilateral relations and reforms in the Russian Federation and China." The minister's statement is perhaps not so much an observation on an accomplished fact as it is a prediction.

The structure of consumer goods imports from the PRC is changing, but is still to a large extent defined by the specific characteristics of our domestic market, its degree of saturation, the nature of demand by region, etc., and to a much lesser extent depends on the decisions made by Chinese administrative bodies. Moreover, a nit-picking analyst might find a certain amount of cunning in those decisions. On the one hand, the decision is made to control the quality of the products exported. On the other, the Chinese leadership is perfectly well aware that the huge quantities of consumer goods being manufactured in China's cottage industries by poorly-skilled workers out of materials of dubious quality have to be sold somewhere. Where? In the United States? In Western Europe? In the rapidly developing Asian countries that border the PRC? Of course not! The shipments sent there are completely different, and genuinely of export quality. Furthermore, the quality of the product is directly proportional to the importing country's "level of civilization." The quality of products supplied also determines the dynamics of import growth. It is no coincidence that all the countries among China's top 10 trading partners (except for the Russian Federation, which is last on the list) — i.e. Hong Kong, Japan, the United States, Germany, South Korea and a number of countries in Western Europe and Southeast Asia — upped their purchases from the PRC by a factor of 1.5 in the first two months of this year.

As for shipments of poor-quality products to the Russian Federation, no matter what measures are taken by China's leaders, they are objectively uninterested in any massive curtailment of that type of production, as that would inevitably result in higher unemployment and exacerbate the already far-from-tranquil social situation in their country. And if the Russian market keeps eagerly absorbing the products, then it is unlikely that any decree could halt the flow.

Now let us attempt to examine this issue from a somewhat different point of view. It is would be hard to deny that Chinese products (of the quality we have been discussing) have a stable and fairly solid niche in our domestic market. Their main advantage — low price — makes them highly competitive, because the overwhelming majority of Russia's citizens has an income level that absolutely will not permit them to purchase the desired but totally unaffordable high-quality products. So the question presents itself, given that fact, should we be fighting the massive influx of cheap Chinese products? Might it perhaps be more important to work seriously on rebuilding our own economy? Because that would allow us to raise people's real income and increase their buying power. Of course, their exactingness with regard to product quality cannot be increased all at once. But market mechanisms will come into play and force suppliers to stop marketing low-quality items.

This is obviously how Russia's leaders view the matter. Therefore during all high-level Russian-Chinese contacts priority is given to finding solutions to fundamental, large-scale issues of bilateral cooperation such as nuclear energy, space, military supply relations and major projects such as the construction of the Sanxia (Three Gorges) multiple-use hydro development, which could well fully realize both countries' tremendous potential. An important contribution toward creation of the practical legal and financial groundwork for bilateral cooperation is expected to come out of an upcoming visit to our country by Chinese State Council Premier Li Peng.

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Political Issues

*Yeltsin's, Chernomyrdin's Roles in Budennovsk Crisis Assessed

954F2659A Moscow MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS in Russian 20 Jun 95 pp 1, 3

[Article by Aleksandr Minkin: "A Commando and the Prime Minister Stopped the War—But Not for Long"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Last Sunday demonstrated how deeply divided are those whom we habitually call the insolent, scathing word "rulers."

Shamil Basayev unwittingly pulled our politics out from under the carpet, from behind the curtains, from memoranda and whispers—and into the daylight.

We had a glimpse of two states in one country: the Russia where there is a president, and the Russia where there is a prime minister.

One was gesticulating and uttering curses; the other conducted tense negotiations. A situation involving hostages can produce any sort of reaction, of course: both aggressive-hysterical and deliberate-businesslike; both tumult and paralysis. But the point is that for two days the president and the prime minister behaved as if the other did not exist at all. Not even once did they utter the familiar chant: "The president and I agreed...." or "The prime minister and I decided...." Roughly speaking, for two days two top officials in Russia did not see each other point blank.

It was expected that, having returned from Halifax, the first thing the president would do would be to meet with the prime minister. If this indeed happened, we do not know about it—it was not shown. Either they did not meet, or they did not agree.

One, for the sake of saving the people, was negotiating with a terrorist. The other, for the sake of prestige, before flying overseas made arrangements with Yerin regarding the assault.

The assault failed. Can the party of assault allow peaceful negotiations to succeed? It would mean, after all, that tens of hostages who died during the assault died for nothing. And whoever gave the order to carry out an assault may end up facing criminal charges. He did see, after all, that in front of the weapons were women. And resolutely walked over dead bodies.

There are many resolute people when there is a desire to shoot. And none when the time comes to answer for it. By Sunday we were already being persistently told that there was allegedly no order to carry out an assault and that the spetznaz had attacked spontaneously.

To attack spontaneously (that is, under the influence of emotions), dooming hundreds of innocent people to death.... It is a pity that people cannot be fired twice. Once for letting KaMAZ's with commandos pass through dozens of road checkpoints. And twice—for the assault.

As for the police, FSB ((Federal Security Service)), and other spetznaz personnel who died in the process, we have to be clearly aware that they died in Budennovsk paying with their lives for their corrupt colleagues.

On Saturday we saw plenty of Yerin, Stepashin, and Grachev; on Sunday they were neither seen or heard from. They failed again. They are sitting tight and quiet again, hoping that Chernomyrdin will fail too and they, always ready to shoot, will be needed again.

On Thursday and Friday, everybody said in unison that an assault in such circumstances (more than 1,000 hostages) was impossible. Only Grachev said that the bandits must be liquidated immediately. Who would have thought that he was the only one marching in step?

* * *

We are gradually beginning to understand: It is good that Brezhnev read everything from paper. It is insurance against ad libbing. Yeltsin's ad libs have lately raised eyebrows and caused concern. To inform the whole world that Western potatoes are inedible and that one could break one's teeth on them—is strange. To say that "we refuse humanitarian aid (for Neftegorsk) because later in return for this aid the islands will be demanded"—and this is at a point when aid from Japan was already coming in full speed—is to insult all Japanese and humiliate all of us. This was not only insulting—it was, alas, also very stupid: If we are not surrendering the islands even according to the terms of a treaty, are we really going to surrender them for syringes and canned meat?

The site of the latest ad lib was Halifax. Yeltsin said that Turkey is taking Dudayev in order to hand him over to a third country—"the further away from Russia, the better." That Turkey and Dudayev refuted this statement is only half the problem. What is worse is that Chernomyrdin, to a question on Dudayev's escape to Turkey, mumbled: "All sorts of people say all sorts of things," although he undoubtedly knew perfectly well **who** was saying "all sorts of things."

For quite some time television companies have needed more courage to show the president live than to show dead bodies in Chechnya. What the president says and **how** he says it leaves one stunned. When ORT ((Public Russian Television)), RTV ((Russian Television)) and

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NTV ((Independent Television)) show him jumping up and throwing up both hands, growling: "Destroy, destroy," you can see that at this moment Clinton wants to be as far away from this as possible. One can clearly see on Clinton's face the desire to sneak away, not to be present at this scene. Well, bear with it, Friend Bill.

* * *

When Yeltsin says that he had an arrangement with Yerin regarding the assault, and then some brass begins to say that there was no assault, only a spontaneous exchange of fire—it only means that now Yeltsin and Yerin have arranged to present the assault as a spontaneous exchange of fire. But will this version be acceptable to those professionals who stormed the building as ordered and now are supposed to look like hysterical juvenile amateurs?

Everybody is taking advantage of the events in Budennovsk. Everybody seeks to profit from them—and therefore everybody's conclusions are different.

Zhirinovskiy demanded a resurrection of the KGB and an increase in its numerical strength to 1 million, and the numerical strength of the military—to 4 million. It is unclear whether this is because he is so militant or so cowardly. We hear that he did fly to Budennovsk. But did not come to the site of the events by a mile. The fact that Zhirinovskiy, with his incessant love of demonstrating himself on television, did not get into the frame in a place swarming with hundreds of television cameras says that he knows how to hide.

Yeltsin demanded that an end be put to international terrorism. A nest was suddenly discovered in the place where we are in the seventh month of our efforts to restore constitutional order. For half a year we insisted that Chechnya was our internal affair: Keep out of it. Now we have international terrorism there. This requires the aid of the world community, moral support, and preferably money. This is very timely. Because the West had already begun wondering whether it should provide credits, which the Russians spend on shooting and bombing their own citizens. Bombing international terrorists is a completely different matter—this is a common cause.

Although, unfortunately, we have to admit that there is no more international terrorism in the Chechens' actions in Budennovsk than there is in the actions of federal troops in Samashki or Groznyy.... The peaceful Russian citizens who died in Budennovsk are no better than those who died in Chechnya. For those who count people not by citizenship but by ethnic origin, let me remind you that thousands of Russians died in Groznyy, and they were just as innocent as the Russians who died in Budennovsk.

Yeltsin wants to convince Russia and the world that the terror began on 14 July [as published] 1995. Alas, it began in December 1994.

Chernomyrdin demanded a halt to military operations. Perhaps Basayev's action gave the prime minister a chance to seriously try to stop the war. He will not succeed.

We remember how Yeltsin many times ordered that "the bombing be stopped." Bombing continued. On 10 May those who watched ORT saw how Yeltsin told Clinton that the war in Chechnya was over. Those who at that time watched "Vesti" heard and saw: "continued heavy fighting with the use of armored vehicles."

For two days Chernomyrdin, conducting negotiations with Basayev, repeatedly gave an order "to stop shooting." But both Basayev and independent information agencies reported from Budennovsk that there was continuous firing at the hospital. In our country the order "not to shoot" does not get carried out.

Basayev said that he and his group "decided to die but stop the war." They presented a condition: Withdraw the troops. Unfortunately, this is the only way to stop the war. There is no other way. As long as troops are in Chechnya, they will not stop shooting, and they will not stop getting shot at. It is doubtful that Chernomyrdin can insist on the withdrawal of troops. This is "too much." He will not be permitted to do it.

Peace is impossible. Peace cannot originate from a commando. Yeltsin will not put up with (he will not be permitted to put up with) a peace imposed on him. And by whom?! Not Friend Bill—a bandit. A Chechen bandit did what nobody else had been able to do. With one raid he overrode all false moratoriums by showing who wants peace and who does not.

* * *

Peace is almost impossible. The prime minister's job, on the other hand, may become vacant. Those who watched Chernomyrdin's telephone negotiations with Basayev probably noticed how Chernomyrdin every time insistently demanded that journalists be present on both sides of the telephone line. Chernomyrdin kept repeating: "We are talking in front of everyone."

Of course, he was not saying this for Basayev. And not for us, citizens of Russia. He was saying it exclusively for the Kremlin. Chernomyrdin was aware that if the president "arranged for the assault," called for liquidation of the "center of international terrorism,"

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and said that negotiations with bandits are not possible, whoever started such negotiations would enter into a serious confrontation with the president.

Chernomyrdin was aware that his every word could be maliciously and duplicitously misinterpreted, and therefore conducted negotiations publicly. He knew that he would get a lot of flak for the "How are you?" greeting to Basayev, but he was going all the way, disregarding trifles.

Dozens of telephone conversations between the prime minister and the terrorist were torturously hampered because of a poor connection. Everything would have been dramatically simpler and better if the prime minister had come to Budennovsk. Was he afraid? Of course not. Did he consider it beneath him? I think not. But he wanted to be in the Kremlin's sight all the time. He wanted to prevent anyone accusing him of secret, self-seeking negotiations. The credit for such worldwide openness should probably go to Vitaliy Ignatenko. Chernomyrdin won a lot. Some fear that he won too much.

Every time we saw the prime minister talking with Basayev, Soskovets loomed behind his back. Silently. Without a single word. And only once in a while did a slight grin enliven the face of the first deputy prime minister. He was present in the office, but will be absent in the transcript.

Chernomyrdin's risk is greater than that of Basayev. Basayev has nothing to lose—his children have all been killed already. Chernomyrdin could lose something enormous—his career. Chernomyrdin made a bet on negotiations, and he needs them to succeed.

But others need them to fail. So that they can tell the world community again: See, you cannot talk to bandits.

* * *

Constant reports about some "new demands" on the part of Basayev were assiduously presented as whims, as commandos' willfulness. It is easy to judge from Moscow. From Moscow, it seems there is nothing easier than to walk out of the hospital, board buses, and go back to Chechnya. But if you think a bit, you understand that retreating after an operation is the most difficult part.

We have two authorities. But they are both executive. Nobody takes seriously the Duma's threats to get the government to resign. People are going about their business; they do not have time for the deputies. When Kovalev was taking the telephone receiver from Basayev, one could not hear what he was saying but one could clearly see the prime minister's annoyance: If you want to go—go. He was saying it as "do what you want, just stay out of the way; we do not have time for you." The Stavropol Kray governor, on the other hand, expressed great displeasure over the deputies. "People demand at rallies," he said, "that the good-for-nothing deputy get out of here!" (and named Kovalev, but did not name either Zhirinovskiy or Kashpirovskiy). One can understand the governor. He is willing to organize 100 rallies if it enables him to remove from here anyone who may inquire how the MVD ((Ministry of Internal Affairs)) personnel subordinate to him let Basayev's KaMAZ's through.

Peaceful resolution of the most cruel and large-scale terrorist operation involving hostage-taking, unfortunately, runs contrary to the interests of enforcement structures. They will have to face an investigation.

We still have not been told whether all the road police, through whose checkpoints the KaMAZ's drove to Budennovsk, have been arrested. We were told that some police officer **after checking the documents** shot in the back and killed a Russian female journalist, but has he been arrested? I am convinced that had this murder taken place at night, it would have been attributed to the Chechens. But it happened in broad daylight.

As did the whole Chechen war.

Four Categories Created To Define Russian Political Parties

954E1071C Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 1 Jun 95 p 3

[Article by Gleb Cherkasov: "The Modest Embrace of Russia's Parties: They Are Powerless, but Easy To Use"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The political parties and movements that first appeared in Russia five years ago have prompted more debate and idle speculation than any other political innovation resulting from perestroyka. An overwhelming majority of the citizens of the USSR (or Russia) had grown accustomed to thinking that, firstly, there should only be one party and, secondly, it should definitely be large and powerful. Thus the emergence of numerous new, weak parties has been perceived as a parody of real political power.

The current political parties and movement can be provisionally divided into four types.

1. The 'Train Parties'

Parties and movements of this type are established under a specific leader, who plays the role of locomotive

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in elections, pulling a whole train of sympathizers along with him. Besides the leader, the "train parties" also consist of lower-ranking politicians who fight over places near the "locomotive" or, in other words, decide who will have seats in the sleeping car, who will travel coach and who will have to be content with the most uncomfortable seats. The leader's positions are immutable, something that cannot be said about any of the party activists. If the "locomotive" enjoys success, the number of cars in the train increases. If things are not going so well, various types of "cars" begin to uncouple from the train. Oddly enough, a "train wreck" results in the political death of virtually none of the passengers.

This category of social and political organization definitely includes the Russia Is Our Home Movement, the Russia's Democratic Choice Party, the Great Power and Yabloko movements, the Party of Russian Unity and Accord [PRES] and the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia [LDPR].

2. The 'Panama-Hat Parties'

This type of party is nothing more than a reduced and poorer-quality version of the "train party." Some politician decides that in order to successfully extend his political career he needs to create a structure that can be registered at the federal level as a party or movement. As a rule, these "panama-hat parties" consist of one well-known individual, the actual leader, who keeps the party — like a summertime panama hat — in the event of an emergency (a heat wave). In this case, when the leader no longer needs the "panama-hat party" it quietly dies of neglect.

3. The 'Motel Parties' and the 'Emergency Landing Strip Parties'

"Motel parties" are established in the following way: some nationwide organization is registered, but without a single politician with national celebrity or recognition involved. The party actively develops and acquires some, albeit small, degree of recognition, after which, and just prior to the start of an election, it hospitably offers slots on its candidate slate to genuinely famous people, who are already conducting their own election campaign. The most obvious example of a "motel party" in the last election was the Russian Movement for Democratic Reform [RMDR]. Its election slate included politicians who had never worked with the RMDR before, and who left it immediately after the election.

The "emergency landing strip parties" are a combination of the "motel party" and the "panama-hat party." As a rule, organizations of this type are set up just in case, on the principle that they will be there if they are needed. When the moment for action comes, the real owners take over the "emergency landing strip party." In order words, somewhere in the Far North is an airfield, with a platoon of troops and their commander stationed there. Among the unit's duties is to keep the runways clear of snow. If the high command suddenly has a need for the airfield, then the necessary equipment and specialized personnel will be deployed there, and the platoon of soldiers will take their shovels and head for another reserve airfield.

4. The 'Corporation Parties'

Parties of this type are not built around a specific leader or a specific political situation, but instead around the interests of those who form their backbone. The people who form a "corporation party" are linked not so much by ideological principles as by habit and the desire to work together. As a rule these are parties and movements that were established at the dawn of party building in Russia: the DPR [Democratic Party of Russia], the RPRF [Republican Party of the Russian Federation], the SDPR [Social Democratic Party of Russia] and the PPFR [People's Party of Free Russia] (now the RSDPP [Russian Social Democratic People's Party]). Curiously, originally these organizations were either leader parties (the DPR and the PPFR) or emerged as a result of a specific political situation (the RPRF), yet subsequently managed to remain in existence after the departure of irreplaceable leaders, though they did lose some of their regional organizations.

Actually, no political party can be placed wholly in any of the above categories. For example, while the RMDR played the role of "motel" in the last election, it is essentially a "corporation party," and Russia's Democratic Choice is gradually being transformed into a "corporation party." Any party could play the role of "motel"; moreover, in an election campaign that is simply essential.

The moment of truth for Russia's parties was the election campaign in the fall of 1993, when a presidential edict on the elections reserved half the seats in the future Duma for them and provided additional campaign benefits for them as well.

Work on an election law by the State Duma deputies in the spring of 1995 provided the impetus for revival of the old debate on the role of political parties in Russia. Those who supported an increase in the number of single-seat districts insisted that the overwhelming majority of parties existed only inside the Garden Ring, and that their real influence on the minds of their fellow citizens was extremely slight, and that therefore it was both illogical and ill-advised to guarantee them half the seats in the Duma. The arguments of those

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who favored maintaining the electoral status quo were probably less convincing. In any event, the president vetoed the law, citing among other things the need to change the proportions to favor a majority-based system.

Despite the fact that the role of party slates will be substantially reduced in the upcoming election, a party-building boom is still underway on the Russian political scene. According to Sergey Shakhray, the Ministry of Justice registers four new parties and movements every week, and there is no reason to believe that the process will stop in the foreseeable future. The flourishing of the Russian multiparty system is exceeding all expectations and permissible limits.

Of course, the role of Russian parties and movements in the life of our country is extremely small and cannot be compared with the influence of parties in Europe or the United States. However, we feel that the current weakness of social and political organizations does not mean that these forms of social and political activity are not suitable for Russia. It seems that a genuinely national party cannot emerge in a country where regional leaders do not comply with presidential edicts or government decrees and quite calmly ignore federal legislation. The partyphobes who reproach parties for representing nothing more than "Moscow turf wars" and not reflecting the regions' interests are not taking into consideration the fact that in essence Moscow's role in the affairs of the country does not correspond to the position that a capital should occupy in any country. Unfortunately, it has not occurred to supporters of expanded regional representation in the Duma to establish a standard that would increase the number of politicians from the outlying regions without changing the proportion of "party-slate" and "single-seat" deputies — by requiring each party to use regional candidate slates to compile its national list.

We should note that in a majority of regions the backbone of the local cells of all the parties in a certain portion of the political spectrum is comprised of the same individuals. Journalists at least came to that conclusion a long time ago, after attending party congresses. Actually the problem of democratic or patriotic unity that is the source of so much strife in Moscow was resolved long ago out in the provinces. Furthermore, in a number of components of the Russian Federation the regional branches of virtually all the parties work "for the common good" during local elections.

Naturally every party overstates the numbers and power of its regional structures. Many organizations do not even have local branches, only local correspondents, i.e. activists who cannot significantly influence the situation in their regions but could answer a phone call from Moscow and confirm that a regional branch of the PRES (or the DPR, or the CPRF — just fill in the blank) does exist. Incidentally, there is not a single party that can actually boast that it has branches in every component of the Russian Federation. The criticism of the "partyphobes" that the existing parties do not represent the interests of the Russian provinces are to a large extent correct.

Yet the citizens who have joined together to create Russian parties and movements and have stuck with politics for two or three years are now professional politicians, and as such are often much better prepared to work in parliament than the so-called "regional representatives." Viktor Sheynis, for example, is of the opinion that the regions' opinion is already represented by the Federation Council, and that the Duma should be made up of politicians and legislators. In reality, for several years now the Russian parties have already been attracting everyone who really wants to be involved in politics.

Despite the fact that Russian parties of all four types are truly weak and cannot have a decisive influence on the course of events (it is no coincidence that just six weeks ago virtually no one in the highest levels of government claimed membership in any party), a multiparty system has emerged in Russia. Those who want to be members of a party that is to their liking have just as wide a selection as they do brands of beer at the commercial kiosks.

*Need for Honesty in Politics Stressed

954Q0236A Moscow DELOVOY MIR in Russian 24 Jun 95 p 2

[Article by Dmitriy Olshanskiy, professor and director of Strategic Analysis and Forecasting Center: "From Political Utopias to Predictable Policy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **The essence of Russian policy today can be summed up in just a few words, paraphrasing the well-known allegory: Russian policy is the highest and final stage of its economy. We did not originate the maxim that policy is a paradigm of the economy, but we can confirm it.**

We have spent enough time convincing one another that the policy of our current government is senseless. Yes, this is a fact. We have also spent enough time arguing that it is corrupt. This is also a fact. Consequently, we have spent enough time building utopias. Ethical policy does not exist in Russia today and will not exist in Russia in the near future: Russian policy is and will continue to be extremely cynical. It is unlikely that this policy would seem "smart" to broad segments of the

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population: It is smart enough—not for everyone, but just for those in power. Furthermore, any new president and any new government will be doomed to do almost exactly what the present ones are doing. What they are doing is far from what they want to do; it is simply what they can do. Even if they want to do better, the result is always the same, because politics definitely is a concentrated form of economics.

The state of our economy is reflected symbolically in an intriguing occurrence. President B. Yeltsin of the Russian Federation had a meeting with a group of young economists, post-graduate students, and junior scientific associates. After they had shared their ideas and theories with the president, he asked A. Livshits, his economic adviser, to prepare several edicts and directives on the recommendations of the graduate students and junior scientific associates, expressing their ideas verbatim.

This reminded me of a joke: After the academicians had buried the Soviet economy (the Ryzhkov-Abalkin government) and the professors had driven the Russian economy to ruin (Popov et al), the "laboratory chiefs" destroyed whatever remained (the Gaydar government). Now, apparently, it is the graduate students' turn. It is a good thing that the undergraduates have not been asked for their opinions yet.

We know what kind of economy we have, and we should therefore know what kind of policy we have. This means that our country now has a unique political (or, more precisely, near-political) system which could best be defined as a criminal oligarchy. We should stipulate right away that this is not a reference to specific individuals, but to the system as a whole, which is criminalizing the remnants of the old society, stratum by stratum. In the strictest sense of the term, there is no political system in Russia today, just as there is no policy in the sense of a special and definite means of regulating human relations, using its own special instruments. The events of October 1993 proved that when politicians on both sides call upon armed individuals for assistance in solving their own problems, policy at the top disappears and is replaced by tanks. It also disappears at the bottom, as far as the public is concerned, when crowds of curious onlookers start fighting with the special forces at the sight of the tanks.

When the special political sphere disappears, something completely different automatically begins to be called policy. The seemingly political forms that still remain acquire a new kind of content. What kind of content? The answer is obvious if we notice that the word "team" has been increasingly likely to be replaced by words like "clan" or even "brigade" in references to specific politicians in recent analytical articles. We have grown accustomed to phrases like "political brawls" and so forth. The facts indicate that politics inevitably acquires criminal-oligarchic features in an economy plagued by shortages. This takes various forms, but it is particularly distinct when overt battles take the place of covert "skirmishes under the covers" in the struggle for power. The main battle in the near future will be the upcoming parliamentary elections.

Today we can see that most of the fighting will occur among four main forces. On one side there will be the "ruling party" (the V. Chernomyrdin bloc) alongside the "alternative ruling party" (which is bound to be formed sooner or later by the presidential administration—a "left-of-center bloc" headed either by I. Rybkin or someone else). The forces on the other side will be the "organized" opposition (the Agrarian Party, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, and others) and the "disorganized" opposition (not only V. Zhirinovskiy and A. Rutskoy, but also the suddenly "unconfined" Ye. Gaydar and even G. Yavlinskiy). Anything between these two sides will constitute the pseudo-center, a "quagmire," which will be drawn, bit by bit, to one side or the other.

This differs from the original design, in which two "centers" (Chernomyrdin and Rybkin) were to be opposed by two opposition groups (Communist and patriotic). In spite of all attempts to do better, this is the result. This result suggests that the campaign will be extremely ruthless. After failing to implement the civilized design, the oligarchy will have to use every means at its disposal in the fight for power (and property). It is most likely that the upcoming elections could be absolutely "wild." They could be so savage that the scandals of December 1993 will seem "tame" in comparison.

The side striving to keep its power (and property) and the side striving to gain power (and property) will be forced to resort to the harshest and most extreme measures. Forecasts indicate that there will be ample criminal behavior, and a comparable abundance of exposures. The "defamation files" are already so thick that their contents can be "released" to the news media several times a day. The resulting politicizing of the population will be "negative" (votes against candidates) instead of positive (votes for candidates). By the rules of 1993, the public would vote "against all candidates," but the new law deliberately deprived the voters of this option. Therefore, a low level of voter turnout should be expected.

Several realistic scenarios have been described in detail. The gist is quite simple. After the oligarchy has seized property (and power), it will strive to strengthen its own position by establishing it in some lasting, quasi-

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political form. The division of deputies into "highly trustworthy" and "moderately trustworthy" means that a completely "malleable" Duma is already a foregone conclusion. This will lead to the kind of altercations over the original division of spheres of influence and "pieces of pie" in which the oligarchic nature of the regime will become evident to everyone. This realization will come too late, however. We know that one of the more specific implications of this kind of regime is that an oligarchy (especially a criminal one) usually has no need for an elite (especially an intellectual one). This is the most disturbing of the long-range ramifications.

A short time ago it seemed that when the Russian oligarchy was preparing for the elections and analyzing the possible patterns of electoral behavior, it was willing to concede that the consolidation of the electorate would presuppose the consolidation of the elite. Later events proved, however, that the oligarchy was approaching the elections with no plans to consolidate the elite, and there has been no indication to the contrary. This means that our elite is unnecessary to our oligarchy—at least in connection with the upcoming elections. This is not merely a failure to consider certain factors. It is a stance, and an extremely dangerous one.

In conclusion, I would like to say a few words about the "elite clubs." There are around 10 of these elitist, primarily intellectual, clubs in the capital. History tells us that when the transition from the absolute power of monarchs to more democratic forms of politics began in Europe, there were no parties. Everything started with the "clubs" which gradually became the prototypes of future significant parties. These then developed into a normal multi-party system. The clubs should play a comparable role in Russia today, with its artificial and highly deformed pseudo-multi-party system. They should not only nominate their own candidates; they should also create the kind of political atmosphere in which a real multi-party system will become simply inevitable. To this end, the elite clubs could begin by addressing one of the most disturbing issues of the day: How honest will the elections be? There are so many rumors about possible fraud, about tampering with the electronic voting system, and so forth. The intellectual elite can remember when the screens of the U.S.-supplied supercomputers suddenly "went blank" in the recent Mexican election. Furthermore, this occurred at the very time when the figures on the screen suggested that the opposition was ahead. When the computers were turned back on, the "ruling party" was the winner.

Several clubs could take the initiative in forming a unique movement, perhaps even a completely non-political one, known as the "movement for honest elections." With all of the parties, blocs, and movements we have today, what we need most is an honest party. This would be a source of opportunity for the elite and of hope for the population.

*Poll Rates Leading Politicians for May

954F2635A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 21 Jun 95 p 4

[Article by Aleksandr Kinsburskiy, under the rubric "Political Olympus": "Russia's 100 Leading Politicians in May: Chernomyrdin Comes In Ahead of Yeltsin"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **Vox Populi, a public opinion research service, jointly with NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA continues to identify monthly the top 100 most influential Russian politicians, ranking them in order of influence (from 1 to 100) and giving each the averaged grade that registers the "weight" of each—both with and without taking into account the sign (positive or negative) of their effect on Russia's domestic and foreign policy over the past month. The preliminary list, in addition to the names of politicians who made the list in April, also included the names of 50 state and public figures, who actively showed up in May of this year. The measure and indicator of their influence was assigned by experts—top figures in the mass media, prominent political commentators, and political scientists. Measure of influence was graded on a scale in which "10" indicates the highest and "1"—the lowest degree of influence. If the politician, in the experts' opinion, over the past month did not play any role at all in Russian politics, he received a grade of "0." On the basis of the average grade—without and with the indicator incorporated into the calculation—the following list of Russian politicians was compiled, those who, in the experts' opinion, exerted the greatest influence on Russian politics. The poll was conducted from 29 to 31 May of this year.**

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100 Leading Politicians of Russia in May

Ranking	Surname, first name, patronymic	Average rating (without adjusting for influence indicator)		Average rating (adjusted for influence indicator)	
		May	(April)	May	(April)
1.	Chernomyrdin Viktor Stepanovich	8.08	(7.58)	+3.62	(+5.52)
2.	Yeltsin Boris Nikolayevich	8.06	(7.70)	+1.12	(+1.76)
3.	Luzhkov Yuriy Mikhaylovich	7.06	(6.82)	+4.62	(+4.78)
4.	Chubays Anatoliy Borisovich	6.44	(6.04)	+1.44	(+1.86)
5.	Korzhakov Aleksandr Vasilyevich	6.24	(6.44)	-2.88	(-2.92)
6.	Rybkin Ivan Petrovich	6.18	(6.52)	+2.62	(+3.76)
7.	Yavlinskiy Grigoriy Alekseyevich	6.06	(5.42)	+3.56	(+3.66)
8.	Grachev Pavel Sergeyevich	5.92	(6.06)	-3.58	(-3.40)
9-10.	Soskovets Oleg Nikolayevich	5.64	(5.64)	+0.56	(-0.60)
9-10.	Zyuganov Gennadiy Andreyevich	5.64	(5.12)	-0.98	(-0.48)
11.	Dudayev Dzhokhar Musayevich	5.54	(5.66)	-4.70	(-4.98)
12.	Kozyrev Andrey Vladimirovich	5.50	(6.12)	+0.18	(+0.48)
13.	Shumeyko Vladimir Filippovich	5.48	(5.74)	-0.64	(-0.72)
14.	Ilyushin Viktor Vasilyevich	5.28	(5.22)	+0.58	(+0.82)
15.	Yerin Viktor Fedorovich	5.18	(5.32)	-1.54	(-1.72)
16-17.	Zhirinovskiy Vladimir Volfovich	5.16	(5.30)	-3.70	(-3.60)
16-17.	Filatov Sergey Aleksandrovich	5.16	(5.36)	+1.66	(+1.40)
18.	Lebed Aleksandr Ivanovich	5.10	(5.04)	+1.64	(+1.72)
19.	Gaydar Yegor Timurovich	4.88	(4.52)	+1.52	(+2.36)
20.	Nemtsov Boris Yefimovich	4.60	(4.60)	+3.22	(+3.62)

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		Average rating (without adjusting for influence indicator)		Average rating (adjusted for influence indicator)	
21.	Shakhray Sergey Mikhaylovich	4.50	(4.78)	+1.00	(+0.80)
22-23.	Livshits Aleksandr Yakovlevich	4.48	(4.56)	+2.78	(+3.20)
22-23.	Lobov Oleg Ivanovich	4.48	(4.56)	-1.36	(-1.62)
24.	Lapshin Mikhail Ivanovich	4.42	(3.84)	+0.58	(+0.46)
25.	Yasin Yevgeniy Grigoryevich	4.40	(4.84)	+2.92	(+3.84)
26.	Satarov Georgiy Aleksandrovich	4.36	(4.02)	+1.62	(+1.56)
27-29.	Govorukhin Stanislav Sergeyevich	4.34	(4.74)	+0.46	(+0.92)
27-29.	Paramonova Tatyana Vladimirovna	4.34	(4.18)	+2.66	(+2.14)
27-29.	Aleksiy II	4.34	(4.84)	+3.42	(+3.88)
30.	Baturin Yuriy Mikhaylovich	4.32	(4.36)	+2.82	(+2.92)
31-32.	Shoygu Sergey Kuzhugetovich	4.26	(3.92)	+2.98	(+3.34)
31-32.	Ilyushenko Aleksey Nikolayevich	4.26	(4.54)	-2.08	(-1.46)
33.	Shaymiyev Mintimer Sharipovich	4.18	(4.28)	+2.00	(+3.02)
34.	Primakov Yevgeniy Maksimovich	4.14	(4.08)	+2.00	(+1.78)
35.	Panskov Vladimir Georgiyevich	4.12	(4.04)	+1.70	(2.28)
36.	Abdulatipov Ramazan Gadzhimuratovich	4.10	(4.66)	+3.04	(+3.34)
37.	Glazyev Sergey Yuryevich	4.08	(3.94)	+0.90	(+1.32)
38-39.	Barsukov Mikhail Ivanovich	4.04	(4.34)	-1.56	(-1.94)
38-39.	Stepashin Sergey Vadimovich	4.04	(4.82)	-0.68	(-0.44)
40.	Aushev Ruslan Sultanovich	3.84	(4.36)	+2.96	(+2.68)
41-42.	Kovalev Sergey Adamovich	3.76	(4.68)	+0.62	(+1.82)
41-42.	Lukin Vladimir Petrovich	3.76	(4.00)	+2.32	(+3.04)

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		Average rating (without adjusting for influence indicator)		Average rating (adjusted for influence indicator)	
43.	Zaveryukha Aleksandr Kharlampiyevich	3.74	(3.60)	-0.30	(+0.90)
44.	Fedorov Boris Grigoryevich	3.68	(3.90)	+0.82	(+1.56)
45.	Kiselev Yevgeniy Alekseyevich	3.64	(4.00)	+1.28	(+1.74)
46.	Gonchar Nikolay Nikolayevich	3.62	(3.32)	+2.32	(+2.64)
47.	Zatulin Konstantin Fedorovich	3.54	(3.80)	+0.28	(-0.50)
48.	Galazov Akhsarbek Khadzhimuratovich	3.50	(3.44)	+1.40	(+1.92)
49-50.	Skokov Yuriy Vladimirovich	3.46	(4.18)	+0.86	(+0.24)
49-50.	Poptsov Oleg Maksimovich	3.46	(4.00)	+1.82	(+2.62)
51.	Nikolayev Andrey Ivanovich	3.42	(3.76)	+3.12	(+2.42)
52.	Tuleyev Aman-Geldy Moldagazyyevich	3.40	(3.28)	+0.12	(-0.56)
53.	Ilyukhin Viktor Ivanovich	3.38	(3.46)	-0.28	(-0.14)
54.	Isakov Vladimir Borisovich	3.26	(2.54)	+0.04	(-0.24)
55.	Shafranik Yuriy Konstantinovich	3.22	(3.24)	+1.32	(+0.82)
56-57.	Kokoshin Andrey Afanasyevich	3.18	(3.74)	+1.24	(+1.96)
56-57.	Lakhova Yekaterina Filippovna	3.18	(3.10)	+1.66	(+1.82)
58-59.	Ryabov Nikolay Timofeyevich	3.14	(3.60)	+0.78	(+0.64)
60.	Yarov Yuriy Fedorovich	3.12	(3.52)	+1.12	(+1.76)
61-63.	Yegorov Nikolay Dmitriyevich	3.10	(2.62)	-0.68	(-0.62)
61-63.	Volskiy Arkadiy Ivanovich	3.10	(3.26)	+1.58	(+2.00)
61-63.	Gorbachev Mikhail Sergeyevich	3.10	(2.98)	+0.52	(+0.96)
64-66.	Dolgolaptev Anatoliy Vasilyevich	3.06	(3.40)	+1.24	(+1.22)
64-66.	Stroyev Yegor Semenovich	3.06	(3.14)	+1.42	(+1.56)

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		Average rating (without adjusting for influence indicator)		Average rating (adjusted for influence indicator)	
64-66.	Fedorov Nikolay Vasilyevich	3.06	(3.10)	+2.40	(+2.12)
67-68.	Golembiovskiy Igor Nestorovich	3.04	(3.46)	+1.50	(+2.44)
67-68.	Rutskoy Aleksandr Vladimirovich	3.04	(3.62)	-1.44	(-1.36)
69-70.	Gromov Boris Vsevolodovich	2.98	(2.88)	+1.28	(+1.86)
69-70.	Sobchak Anatoliy Aleksandrovich	2.98	(3.12)	+0.60	(+1.22)
71.	Kovalev Valentin Alekseyevich	2.96	(2.94)	-0.10	(+0.28)
72-74.	Belyayev Sergey Georgiyevich	2.88	(2.60)	+1.66	(+1.24)
72-74.	Zadornov Mikhail Mikhaylovich	2.88	(2.36)	+2.04	(+1.48)
72-74.	Yushenkov Sergey Nikolayevich	2.88	(3.24)	+1.14	(+1.52)
75-76.	Boldyrev Yuriy Yuryevich	2.84	(2.50)	+1.78	(+1.90)
75-76.	Tumanov Vladimir Aleksandrovich	2.84	(3.24)	+1.86	(+2.44)
77-78.	Boyko Oleg Viktorovich	2.78	(3.06)	+0.54	(+0.72)
77-78.	Shcherbakov Vladimir Ivanovich	2.78	(2.64)	+1.04	(+0.94)
79-81.	Rossel Eduard Edgardovich	2.72	(2.76)	+1.56	(+1.72)
79-81.	Poltoranin Mikhail Nikiforovich	2.72	(3.30)	-0.48	(-0.76)
79-81.	Resin Vladimir Iosifovich	2.72	(2.66)	+1.32	(+1.14)
82-84.	Vengerovskiy Aleksey Dmitriyevich	2.70	(2.80)	+0.32	(-0.44)
82-84.	Kolesnikov Mikhail Petrovich	2.70	(3.00)	+0.98	(+0.46)
82-84.	Khakamada Irina Mitsyovna	2.70	(2.82)	+1.10	(+1.72)
85-86.	Ilyumzhinov Kirsan Nikolayevich	2.68	(2.28)	+0.74	(+0.50)
85-86.	Tarpishchev Shamil Anvarovich	2.68	(2.68)	-0.38	(-0.24)
87.	Anpilov Viktor Ivanovich	2.64	(2.16)	-1.68	(-2.00)

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		Average rating (without adjusting for influence indicator)		Average rating (adjusted for influence indicator)	
88-89.	Krasnov Mikhail Aleksandrovich	2.62	(2.10)	+1.12	(+1.18)
88-89.	Yakovlev Aleksandr Nikolayevich	2.62	(3.62)	+0.26	(-0.10)
90.	Nosovets Sergey Anatolyevich	2.58	(2.96)	-0.12	(-0.62)
91.	Lukyanov Anatoliy Ivanovich	2.52	(2.12)	-0.64	(-0.50)
92-94.	Nevzorov Aleksandr Glebovich	2.50	(2.96)	-0.56	(-1.18)
92-94.	Petrov Yuriy Vladimirovich	2.50	(3.04)	+0.88	(+1.34)
92-94.	Fedulova Alevtina Vasilyevna	2.50	(2.74)	+0.90	(+1.38)
95-98.	Baburin Sergey Nikolayevich	2.48	(2.04)	-0.32	(-0.24)
95-98.	Davydov Oleg Dmitriyevich	2.48	(2.46)	+0.84	(+1.58)
95-98.	Tyazhlov Anatoliy Stepanovich	2.48	(2.44)	+0.92	(+1.40)
95-98.	Sheynis Viktor Leonidovich	2.48	(2.76)	+1.20	(+1.06)
99.	Stepanov Viktor Nikolayevich	2.46	(2.92)	+1.64	(+2.04)
100.	Mityukov Mikhail Alekseyevich	2.40	(2.52)	+1.28	(+1.60)

In May, the top place on the political Olympus went to Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, the leader of the new electoral association Our Home—Russia. Judging by the obtained results, in terms of political influence he came ahead of President Boris Yeltsin, albeit by only two-hundredths of a point. True, both politicians' rating rose perceptibly over the past month; however, Yeltsin's rose by one-third of a point, Chernomyrdin's—by one-half. And if we take into account the indicator of their influence on Russia's domestic and foreign policy, we should add that the positive rating of both declined as compared to April by a factor of about 1.5.

There are interesting changes in the top five and the top 10 Russian politicians. Anatoliy Chubays, first deputy prime minister of the Russian Government, moved up significantly—from eighth to fourth place. The top 10 this time included such politicians as Yabloko party leader Grigoriy Yavlinskiy (7), First Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets (9), and Gennadiy Zyuganov, head of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (10). On the other hand, State Duma Chairman Ivan Rybkin no longer made it to the top five, while President of the Chechen Republic Dzhokhar Dudayev (11), Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrey Kozyrev (12), and Vladimir Shumeyko, speaker of the parliament's upper house (12), dropped out of the top 10.

Judging by expert estimates, nobody in the political arena achieved tremendous success last month—none of the Russian politicians was able to increase his political influence by more than one whole point. At the same time, the rating of one of them—Aleksandr N. Yakovlev, leader of the recently created Party of Social Democracy (89)—declined by exactly one point. Let us recall that the standing of this politician declined for the second month in a row: In April he was in 50-51st place, and in March—23rd!

Overall, characterizing the May ratings, we may say that they do not show great differences compared to April. For instance, the average ratings of three politicians—the aforementioned Oleg Soskovets, as well as Nizhniy

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Novgorod Oblast Governor Boris Nemtsov (20) and adviser to the RF ((Russian Federation)) president Shamil Tarpishchev (86)—were exactly the same to a hundredth of a point. And in last place, as last month, is State Duma Deputy Chairman Mikhail Mityukov, albeit with a somewhat lower average rating.

In May, Mikhail Krasnov, the RF president's aide for legal questions, made it to the top 100 most influential Russian politicians (88) for the first time. Another eight persons who again made it to the list of 100 leading political figures were State Duma committee chairman Mikhail Zadornov (73), member of the Federation Council Yuriy Boldyrev (75), President of the Republic of Kalmykia Kirsan Ilyumzhinov (85), leader of the Russian Communist Workers Party Viktor Anpilov (87), former chairman of the USSR Supreme Council Anatoliy Lukyanov (91), chairman of the Russian All-People's Union party Sergey Baburin (95), Oleg Davydov, deputy prime minister of the government and RF minister of foreign economic relations (96), and member of the Federation Council Anatoliy Tyazhlov (97).

Over the past month, Dmitriy Rogozin, Aleksandr Prokhanov, Vasiliy Lipitskiy, Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, Lev Ponomarev, Gavriil Popov, Mikhail Nikolayev, Petr Romanov, and Sergey Mavrodi were dropped from the list of the top 100 Russian politicians.

The list of the 10 state and public figures who, in the experts' opinion, made the greatest positive contribution to Russian domestic and foreign policy in May is as follows:

1. Mayor of Moscow Yuriy Luzhkov: +4.62

2. Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin: +3.62

3. Leader of the Yabloko party Grigoriy Yavlinskiy: +3.56

4. Aleksiy II, Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia: +3.42

5. Governor of Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast Boris Nemtsov: +3.22

6. Director of the Federal Border Service Andrey Nikolayev: +3.12

7. Deputy chairman of the Federation Council Ramazan Abdulatipov: +3.04

8. Minister of Emergency Situations Sergey Shoygu: +2.98

9. President of the Ingush Republic Ruslan Aushev: +2.96

10. Minister of Economics Yevgeniy Yasin: +2.92

And vice versa, the list of the 10 state and public figures who, in the experts' opinion, had the greatest negative influence on the course of events last month is like this:

1. President of the Chechen Republic Dzhokhar Dudayev: -4.70

2. Leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia Vladimir Zhirinovskiy: -3.70

3. Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev: -3.58

4. Chief of the Presidential Security Service Aleksandr Korzhakov: -2.88

5. Acting general procurator Aleksey Ilyushenko: -2.08

6. Leader of the Russian Communist Workers Party Viktor Anpilov: -1.68

7. Leader of the Russian National Unity party Aleksandr Barkashov: -1.62

8. Chief of the Russian Main Protection Administration Mikhail Barsukov: -1.56

9. Minister of Internal Affairs Viktor Yerin: -1.54

10. State Duma Deputy Sergey Mavrodi: -1.48

Characteristically, this time two new faces appeared among the 10 main positive political "heroes": Andrey Nikolayev and Ruslan Aushev (replacing Ivan Rybkin and Aleksandr Livshits), and Yuriy Luzhkov in terms of his positive influence even pushed Viktor Chernomyrdin down to second place. Aleksey Ilyushenko made it to the list of main "anti-heroes" in May, while Oleg Lobov, correspondingly, dropped out.

Answers to the question traditionally posed to experts "Which of the Russian politicians included in the preliminary list currently has the greatest chance of winning the Russian presidential elections if they are held soon?" were distributed as follows (number of experts who named a particular politician):

	May	(April)
V. Chernomyrdin	27	(23)
G. Yavlinskiy	27	(22)
B. Yeltsin	25	(18)
G. Zyuganov	15	(16)
A. Lebed	13	(12)
V. Zhirinovskiy	11	(15)
I. Rybkin	7	(15)
Yu. Luzhkov	6	(5)

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	May	(April)
A. Rutskoy	4	(7)
Yu. Skokov	3	(5)
N. Ryzhkov	2	(2)

The experts also named A. Volskiy, S. Govorukhin, N. Gonchar, B. Gromov, A. Kozyrev, M. Lapshin, B. Nemtsov, Ye. Stroyev, S. Filatov, A. Chubays, S. Shakhray, and V. Shumeyko.

***Reliability, Methodology of Some Opinion Polls Critiqued**

954E1071B Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 1 Jun 95 p 3

[Article by Tatyana Kuznetsova, sociologist: "Caution: Survey! — Imprecise Handling of Sociological Data Fraught With Political Consequences"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Recently the media have published a large number of public opinion poll results. The elections are getting closer, and both ordinary voters and politicians are starting to pay much closer attention to these articles. However, to avoid being misled they should scrutinize that sort of material very carefully, because much data that is obviously of poor quality is being published along with reliable information. In theory, the newspapers should be the ones to distinguish which is which. But readers should also be able to distinguish reliable data from sloppy work.

Public polling is necessary to get an idea of what is happening in society and of what so-called "ordinary" people are thinking and how they feel about various events and decisions by those in power. A sociological survey is one of the most objective, impartial and rapid means of taking the "social temperature" at any given moment.

It is useful to bear in mind what precedes the publication in a newspaper or magazine of that column of figures and those conclusions that a certain number of people support one thing, while a certain percentage supports something else. Studies based on surveys have become commonplace in applied sociology. They are based on the following. Firstly, recording of people's opinions through interviews in which the questions posed to the person being interviewed (the respondent) are recorded, or surveyed, or in which the respondent himself answers the questions by filling out a survey form offered to him. The survey form is created in accordance with scientific principles: it must exist in only one form and be standardized (i.e. absolutely the same for all respondents, so that the answers obtained will be comparable), and the questions in it must be carefully formulated in such a way as to avoid prompting the respondent to give a certain answer.

Secondly, application of the theory of probability and statistics makes it possible to avoid the necessity of surveying a huge number of respondents. It would cost an immense amount to survey the entire population. Furthermore, since participation in polling is strictly voluntary, in the best case a survey will only encompass about one-half of potential respondents. Yet scientifically-based sampling makes it possible for surveys of a relatively small number of individuals to reflect the opinion of the entire population with a significant degree of accuracy.

In addition, conducting a high-quality Russia-wide sociological study request major expenditures and a large staff of qualified personnel. Only strong, well-established sociological services are capable of doing this.

In our country today the usual procedure for conducting a mass survey is as follows. Statistical data for various types of population centers are used to select groups of 1,500, 2,000 or 3,000 people in such a way as to give an indication of data for the entire population being studied by type of population center, sex, age or educational level. A single standardized survey form is created. Then the interviewers go to work, selecting respondents throughout Russia and asking them questions, usually at their place of residence. At this time telephone surveys are not well suited to our country, because outside of Moscow and St. Petersburg only 25 percent of Russia's population have telephones.

The data are entered into a computer and analyzed, and only then are they published. The report and the accompanying article must at the very minimum indicate who conducted the survey, when, and what sample was used. The precise formulation of the questions and all responses to them (in percentages) should be indicated, thereby precluding the possibility of misinterpretation.

Newspapers that want to provide their readers with reliable sociological survey results turn to well-established sociological surveys and publish the results of their studies (KOMMERSANT-DAILY, SEGODNYA, MK et al.). As a rule, their articles are quite accurate — the quality of the information is guaranteed by the organization that does the study. But other newspapers, trying to save money, rely on little-known services that often have grandiose names and are still in the process of establishing their own sociological services. With the best of intentions, of course. But in such cases it is impossible to vouch for the accuracy of the results.

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Some attempt to conduct a survey by printing a questionnaire in a newspaper, as was recently done by SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA when on 20 May it published a survey form from the so-called Slavic Union Social Technologies Foundation. It is quite obvious that accurate data cannot be obtained in this manner. Incidentally, it appears that those who created this particular questionnaire were not very interested in that, anyway. The questionnaire was a classic example of the use of leading questions, such as: "Do you think that the current Government of the Russian Federation is doing the greatest harm to its people by exceeding that level of taxation above that commonly recognized level, beyond which the decline in citizens' savings in financial institutions also disrupts industrial development?" The permissible answers were "yes," "no" and "I do not know." Not to mention the fact that everyone who sent in a survey form was entered in a cash lottery. When the results of this survey are published, they will undoubtedly be presented as "Russian citizens' opinions."

On 21 April 1995 the newspaper RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA published the findings of an All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center [VTsIOM] poll of one thousand Russian citizens that included the question "In your opinion, what individual has had the greatest influence on world politics in the last 50 years?," failed to mention where the survey was taken and did not indicate the time period during which it was taken. Maybe it was a survey done in provincial town "X" 10 years ago... Who knows?

On 18 February 1995 the newspaper KULTURA published popularity ratings of Russian television programs that are provided weekly by the New Institute for Social and Psychological Research (NISPI). No mention was made of how many people were surveyed or during which week the figures for the average audience of evening news programs were compiled. Nor was there any indication of the methodology by which the survey sample was chosen. Furthermore, at the present time there is not a single sociological service in Russia, even the largest one, that is capable of obtaining weekly data on television ratings for all of Russia, though a few are now in the initial stages of developing that capability. This is because besides the major cities there are medium-size and small cities, not to mention the remote villages where there are televisions but no telephones, meaning that interviewers would have to be sent to those places.

On 17 May 1995 KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, under the heading "They Know Them by Their Faces and by Their Quotes," published the findings of an attempt to determine "who could realistically vie for the job of Russia's president — a survey of 7,000 readers" of their newspaper. Yet the article does not even indicate how the question was formulated, though it is common knowledge that the very same question can be formulated in various ways to produce different responses. Furthermore, one can only speculate as to when this "poll" was taken, and since everyone knows that the situation can change radically in a short period of time, the timeliness of the information is very important. And, finally, nothing is said about the method by which the sample was selected. If the respondents were selected from lists of newspaper subscribers from various postal districts, then even a well-designed sample could correctly reflect only the opinions of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA mail subscribers, not even including those individuals who buy the paper at newsstands, much less the opinion of Russia's entire population. If that is the case, this poll is not comparable to Russian-wide surveys. If the survey form was printed in the paper and every reader was invited to respond, then it would be even more incorrect to claim that "what we see is a fairly objective cross-section of our society that allows us to determine the most worthy [candidate] with a fair degree of accuracy."

A textbook example of what can happen when the laws of sampling are ignored is the competition that took place in 1936 between American sociologist George Gallup and the American magazine LITERARY DIGEST. Gallup conducted selective surveys based on several thousand interviews, following a strictly scientific method developed by him. Respondents were selected in such a way that as a group they provided a model of the social and demographic characteristics of the entire population, and the results he obtained were in line with known statistics. His opponents conducted a massive survey, sending out 10 million questionnaires, and the result was a completely inaccurate prediction.

Nor should one forget that, for example, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA readers, despite the paper's massive circulation and the fact that it is distributed throughout Russia, represent a specific group of people in terms of age and other factors. They are people who read certain kinds of newspapers and magazines. For instance, it is unlikely that any KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA reader is going to pick up the newspaper RUSSKIY PORYADOK [Russian Order] — which is also read by a specific segment of the population. The KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA survey in question was not based on the social and demographic characteristics of Russia's population and therefore should not be presented as such. It should be presented as the opinion of 7,000 KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA readers. (And, moreover, if the survey was based on a questionnaire published in the newspaper, then these are only the most

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active readers — not everyone has the time or desire to fill out and send in a survey form.)

As a rule, newspaper articles about the results of sociological surveys, both in cases where the surveys are taken by the publication itself and when the publication employs the services of well-established sociological services, suffer from certain typical shortcomings. They do not contain all the data mentioned previously, i.e. to what degree the results truly represent the population or how the sampling was done, so that the reader could determine exactly where the results come from. Are they a survey of the entire population, some geographical area, the urban population or, as often happens, just residents of major cities? Usually all these failings are due not to ill intentions but rather to neglect of details.

The result of arbitrary treatment of the principles of representative random polling could be — in addition to misinformation of readers about the election campaign —influence on voters' intentions. The so-called "bandwagon" effect could come into play, with voters casting their votes for the candidate who is heralded in the press as the most popular and who is shown to be number one in the polls, reasoning that since that candidate has already won the election there is supposedly no point in voting for anyone else. Naturally the overwhelming majority of voters would not have a clue as to the real reason for their choice.

As essential as polls are in the political life of society, they can have very real and very negative effects if they are improperly conducted or improperly characterized in the press. So when a reader sees poll results in a newspaper and doubts their accuracy, that reader should ask himself or herself the questions touched upon in this article: who did the survey, who was surveyed, and what was asked?

***Decree Broadens Scope of Justice Ministry Activities**

954E1071A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 9 Jun 95 p 4

[Russian Federation Government Decree No 550, issued 3 June 1995: "On Additional Functions of the Russian Federation Ministry of Justice"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In accordance with Russian Federation Presidential Edict No 2147, issued 3 December 1994 and entitled "On Measures To Improve Legal Support for the Activities of the President of the Russian Federation" (SOBRANIYE ZAKONODATELSTVA ROSSIYSKOY FEDERATSII, 1994, No 32, p 3337), the Government of the Russian Federation hereby decrees:

1. The Russian Federation Ministry of Justice shall be responsible for conducting legal review of legal acts adopted by organs of state authority in the components of the Russian Federation, and for functioning as general contractor for the Russian Federation's system of international legal information exchange.

2. Legal review of legal acts by components of the Russian Federation shall be conducted for the purpose of allowing federal organs of state authority, within the bounds of their powers as enumerated in point "a," Part 1, Article 72 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation and in conjunction with governmental bodies in components of the Russian Federation, to develop measures to ensure that the constitutions, regulations, laws and other legal acts of components of the Russian Federation are in compliance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal laws.

3. Heads of executive governmental bodies in components of the Russian Federation shall ensure that the Russian Federation Ministry of Justice receives copies of all legal acts within 10 days of the time they are passed, as well as copies of official publications in which laws and other legal acts passed by governmental bodies in components of the Russian Federation are published.

4. A legal review shall be carried out within 30 days from the date a legal act is received by the Russian Federation Ministry of Justice. If necessary this time limit may be extended by the Ministry's governing body, but not by more than one month.

In the event that a legal act is not in compliance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation or a federal law, the Russian Federation Ministry of Justice shall present its findings, including arguments in support of them, to the governmental body of the component of the Russian Federation that passed the act in question, as well as to the appropriate federal governmental bodies in accordance with established procedure.

5. In certain of the most complex cases the Russian Federation Ministry of Justice shall be permitted to engage the services of the Government of the Russian Federation's Institute of Legislation and Comparative Legal Procedure or other Russian Federation scientific institutions to improve the scientific level of its legal review.

6. In compliance with the "Agreement on Exchange of Legal Information," approved on 21 October 1994 by the member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Russian Federation Ministry of Justice is hereby designated as the agency authorized to coor-

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dinate efforts to create national databases to be used for the international exchange of legal information.

[Signed] V. Chernomyrdin, chairman, Government of the Russian Federation

Primakov Background, Ties, Views Profiled

954F2671A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English 16-22 Jun 95 No 23, p 7

[Article by Nataliya Gevorkyan and Azer Mursaliyev: "The Four Lives of Yevgeny Primakov"; first paragraph is introductory paragraph]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Yevgeny Primakov, head of the Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS) of the Russian Federation, is one of the few close associates of Gorbachev who has retained his position in the present establishment. Although from an earlier era, he remains influential in the present, and has great prospects for the future.

A Loyal Careerist

Primakov was included among the "Tbilisi lobby" in Moscow. Having grown up in a cosmopolitan district of Tbilisi inhabited by Georgians, Armenians and Jews (the leader of "Mkhedrioni" Dzhaba Ioseliani is from the same district), Primakov speaks fluent Georgian and Armenian. Among his Moscow friends there are quite a few natives of Georgia — Burakovsky, the well-known heart surgeon who died recently, and Lev Onikov, ex-staff member of the CPSU Central Committee. It was from Georgia that he was nominated for election as a deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet. It is rumored that after the return of Shevardnadze to Tbilisi, Primakov suggested that Georgian secret service officers be trained free of charge in Moscow. It is said that he maintains good relations with Georgadze, the present boss of Georgia's security service and considered to be a protege of Moscow.

Primakov's early biography contains nothing particularly noteworthy. His rise to prominence had no major setbacks. Having graduated from the Institute of Oriental Studies in Moscow and post-graduate courses at Moscow University, he worked for some time at the USSR Gosteleradio (State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting). Then he worked at *Pravda*, which sent him to the Middle East as correspondent.

The rumors that Primakov was involved with the intelligence service since that time are not groundless. The retired KGB general Oleg Kalugin maintains that about two thirds of Soviet correspondents abroad were linked to the KGB.

The character of Primakov's work during that period makes it possible to make conclusions about his connection with "secret diplomacy." He frequently visited Northern Iraq where Kurdish guerillas operated. His acquaintance with Saddam Hussein originates from this period.

Friendship with the Iraqi president came in handy on the eve of Desert Storm when Gorbachev, in an attempt to stop the allied attack on Iraq, sent Primakov to Baghdad, and then to a number of Western and Arab capitals. This trip irritated the West and did not prevent the war, but it strengthened the friendship of Primakov and Hussein.

A Moderate Centrist

His contacts with the KGB continued after his return to Moscow in 1970. From 1970 to 1989 Primakov worked at the USSR Academy of Sciences, first as deputy director of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations (IMEMO), and then, having worked as director of the Institute of Oriental Studies, returned again to IMEMO, but this time as its director, replacing Alexander Yakovlev whom Gorbachev returned to party work. The institutes headed by Primakov carried out research at the behest of the KGB and the country's leaders. It must be recalled that early in the 1970s a group of moderate centrists was formed in scientific circles close to the country's leadership. The leading experts for the country's leaders on foreign policy, academicians Arbatov, Inozemtsev, Yakovlev and Primakov were members of the group which prepared the ideological lining for Brezhnev's detente.

A Liberal

With the beginning of perestroika, Yakovlev and other members of the group of moderate centrists were called up from institutes into politics. This "Yakovlevite" wing, set against the background of conservative "followers of Ligachev," gained the reputation of being liberals. Primakov, elected as people's deputy from the CPSU, in June 1989 headed the Soviet of the Union of the USSR Supreme Soviet. In 1990 he joined the presidential council, and in 1991 became a member of the Security Council of the USSR. Holding these posts, Primakov continues to be involved in foreign policy, and even more...

Connected with his name is one of the most bloody events of the Gorbachev period — the January developments in Baku. Primakov began to "supervise" Azerbaijan from the autumn of 1989, when the local Popular Front, having launched a large-scale strike movement, resorted to force against the republican authorities and Moscow. On behalf of the country's leadership Primakov conducted talks with the opposition, and on the

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eve of the events, together with a group of high-ranking officials, arrived in Baku.

At a press conference held after the arrival of troops, Primakov gave a sharp rebuff to foreign journalists, declaring that the incident was an internal affair of the USSR.

A Tough Conservative

On September 30, 1991 Primakov was approved as director of the Central Intelligence Service, detached the day before from the KGB by its new boss Leonid Bakatin. He represented a middle path in the disputes for key posts between Gorbachev and Yeltsin, just as Bakatin. The Belovezhskaya Pushcha agreements in December 1991 washed away the "followers of Gorbachev" from the political proscenium. The Central Intelligence Service was renamed the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia, but to the general surprise of observers, who did not promise Primakov a long career in Yasenevo, he did keep his post. Since then the bosses of Lubyanka and the roster at the former KGB changed at an unnatural speed. But nothing dramatic happened to the secret service in general.

It is hard to say what helped Primakov to win the trust of Yeltsin. An experienced analyst at the head of the secret service, ready to work for the new power, he was of obvious use. Furthermore, it is risky to pester intelligence services too much — the authorities realize well to what international and domestic scandals the secret service is susceptible.

The stability of Primakov as head of the secret service no doubt shows that he played his game with the top leaders and continues to play successfully. But what about the grassroots? The intelligence officers who welcomed the changes, having observed his first steps, came to the conclusion that he is a temporary man whose task is to ensure a stable transition. In their opinion fixed-post spy offices and the central apparatus were reduced at the expense of the supporters of changes, whereas Kryuchkov's personnel were kept. The 30-40 percent reductions in the provinces and in the center affected the "genetic fund" of the secret service — middle management aged 38-45. These were directors of operations, deputy heads of departments and deputy fixed-post spies.

In 1993 only one fixed-post spy office was shut down. During this year there was no information about Foreign Intelligence Service officers deserting to the other side. In 1991-1993 the FIS was criticized by the press, whereas in 1994-1995 the number of critical publications noticeably decreased. Some scandals were even interpreted in a favorable light. The Aldrich Ames case, for example: naturally, it is a pity that we lost our "mole" in the CIA; but my, what a bigwig they recruited and milked for so long!

All the gossip about the resignation of Primakov remained just that: gossip to which Yeltsin, in his speech at Yasenevo on April 26, 1994, respectful to intelligence officers, finally put an end.

Intelligence officers point out among Primakov's innovations the emphasis on analytical work by enlisting experts from other departments, academic institutes and political scientists. This work did not go unnoticed. During his visit to the FIS Yeltsin drew attention to its merits: "I must say that the FIS is highly regarded in the system of Russian state power. I expect that in the future your operative information, analytical conclusions and recommendations will be highly appraised."

Having avoided a confrontation with the power structures, Primakov's service failed to establish mutual understanding with the Foreign Ministry. On December 26, 1993 an FIS report was published, describing the expansion of NATO eastwards as running counter to Russia's interests. But the likely entry of Russia in it is also recognized as a dubious venture. At the same time, the stand of the foreign ministry is made public: no threat to Russia in NATO is observed, each state has the right to ensure its security as it considers it necessary, and the expansion of NATO without Russia is counter-productive and harmful for Russia. The doubts as to which policy was supported by the president were dispelled on the next day by Kostikov, the president's press-secretary, who declared that Primakov's apprehensions were shared "by the army and the citizens of Russia and by the forces which are concerned with the strategic interests of the country."

This report also had other consequences. In the West Primakov became reputed as a tough politician connected with the conservatives and the elite. And in this connection, the persistent rumors about the replacement of Kozyrev with Primakov do not arouse any enthusiasm abroad.

The secret of Kozyrev's failure and the success of Primakov lies hidden in two documents. The first is Yeltsin's speech in Yasenevo. The second is the report of the FIS "Russia — CIS: Does the Western Position Need To Be Corrected?" made public five months later. In fact, the second document is a detailed and well argued version of the first.

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Federal Assembly

***Decree, Statute on Committee for State Reserves**

***Text of Decree**

954E1125A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 21 Jun 95 First Edition p 4

[Decree No 574 of Russian Federation Government of 9 June 1995 "On Ratification of Statute on Committee of Russian Federation for State Reserves," signed by Chairman V. Chernomyrdin of RF Government in Moscow]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Russian Federation Government hereby decrees that:

1. The Committee of the Russian Federation for State Reserves will manage the state material reserve.

2. The attached Statute on the Committee of the Russian Federation for State Reserves is ratified.

3. The Committee of the Russian Federation for State Reserves will be authorized to use 25 percent of the funds generated by the economic activity of enterprises, institutions, and organizations of the state reserve system, in excess of the estimated income and expenditures of special funds approved by the Russian Federation Ministry of Finance, to cover the financial incentives and social needs of state reserve system personnel.

Within two months the Committee of the Russian Federation for State Reserves will plan and approve the procedure for the use of these funds.

4. The State Committee of the Russian Federation for the Administration of State Property will assign the Committee of the Russian Federation for State Reserves the building it occupies in Moscow at No 6/7 Bolshoy Cherkasskiy Lane according to the established procedure, along with the property needed for its functioning as an operational agency.

5. Statute No 990-58 of the Russian Federation Government of 17 December 1992 on the Committee of the Russian Federation for State Reserves is no longer valid.

[Signed] V. Chernomyrdin, Chairman of the Russian Federation Government

***Text of Statute**

954E1125B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 21 Jun 95 First Edition p 4

[Statute on Committee of Russian Federation for State Reserves]

[FBIS Translated Text] 1. The Committee of the Russian Federation for State Reserves (Roskomrezerv) will be the federal agency of the executive branch of government responsible for state regulation and intersectorial coordination in the creation, distribution, storage, use, replenishment, replacement, and renewal of resources in the state reserve supply of physical assets (hereafter referred to as the state reserve).

2. The Committee of the Russian Federation for State Reserves will be guided in its work by the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the federal law "On the State Material Reserve," federal laws, edicts and directives of the President of the Russian Federation, decrees and directives of the Government of the Russian Federation, and this Statute.

3. The Committee of the Russian Federation for State Reserves, its territorial administrations, and the enterprises, institutions, and organizations engaged in the creation, storage, and maintenance of the state reserve will constitute a single federal state reserve system (hereafter referred to as the state reserve system).

The supplies in the state reserve, irrespective of their location, the enterprises, institutions, organizations, and other facilities making up the state reserve system, and the parcels of land on which they are located will be federal property.

The enterprises, institutions, and organizations of the state reserve system will be government facilities and will be guarded by departmental militarized guards.

4. The main functions of the Committee of the Russian Federation for State Reserves will be the following:

the planning and implementation of state policy in the creation, distribution, storage, use, replenishment, replacement, and renewal of state reserve supplies;

the drafting of proposals on the accumulation and issuance of the physical assets of the state reserve for the purpose of securing the mobilization needs of the state, organizing the initial cleanup operations following emergencies, offering state support to various branches of the national economy, enterprises, institutions, organizations, and members of the Russian Federation during temporary interruptions in supplies of the main raw materials, fuel and energy resources, and foodstuffs, rendering humanitarian aid, and regulating the market, and the submission of these proposals to the Government of the Russian Federation;

the organization of deliveries of physical assets to the state reserve and the issuance of materials and goods from the state reserve, and the guarantee of their quantitative and qualitative preservation;

oversight of the creation, storage, and use of the mobilization reserve at enterprises and in institutions and or-

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ganizations with mobilization assignments (irrespective of their property status and departmental jurisdiction);

the guarantee of the steady functioning of the state reserve system in peacetime and wartime, and the development and reinforcement of its material-technical and socioeconomic base;

the guarantee of the effective use of funds allocated for the maintenance and development of the state reserve system and for operations with the physical assets of the state reserve;

the pursuit of a unified technical policy and the incorporation of the latest scientific and technical achievements and advanced experience in the creation, distribution, storage, and use of the state reserve.

5. In accordance with the functions assigned to it, the Committee of the Russian Federation for State Reserves will do the following:

draft proposals on the precise types of physical assets to be kept in the state reserve and the standards and volumes of their accumulation, including essential stocks (with the exception of the physical assets of the mobilization reserve and the special items in the state reserve) and on the procedures for drawing up the lists of assets and drafting the standards for the use of the essential stocks, and submit them to the Government of the Russian Federation;

draft annual assignments on the accumulation, borrowing, and reservation of physical assets of the state reserve as part of state defense orders and submit them for approval according to the procedure defined by the Government of the Russian Federation;

draft proposals for the draft federal budget for the corresponding year on the structure of expenditures in the state reserve system, including expenditures on operations with the physical assets of the state reserve, and submit them according to the established procedure;

perform the functions of a state client in deliveries of physical assets to the state reserve (with the exception of the mobilization reserve) and choose the suppliers of physical assets for the state reserve (partly on the basis of competitive bids) for the subsequent conclusion of state contracts (or agreements) with them;

determine the specific recipients during the conclusion of state contracts (or agreements) on the delivery of physical assets for the state reserve, and discuss and negotiate the assortment, volume, quality, price and dates of the delivery of the physical assets with the suppliers;

conclude state contracts (or agreements) for deliveries of physical assets to the state reserve or request subordinate territorial administrations to conclude them;

plan and organize the economic management and financial activity of the state reserve system, arrange for the financing of subordinate territorial administrations, enterprises, institutions, and organizations according to the established procedure, organize and monitor settlements for physical assets for the state reserve, draft proposals on the procedure for financing expenditures on the maintenance and development of the state reserve system and submit them to the Government of the Russian Federation, and conduct operations with physical assets of the state reserve;

determine the territorial distribution of the physical assets of the state reserve (with the exception of the mobilization reserve), draft special plans listing the enterprises, institutions, and organizations responsible for the storage of physical assets of the state reserve and the assortment and amounts of assets to be stored, and submit the plans to the Government of the Russian Federation;

organize and monitor the preservation of the physical assets of the state reserve stored at industrial, transport, agricultural, supply and sales, and other enterprises and in institutions and organizations (irrespective of their property status and departmental jurisdiction);

arrange for the issuance of physical assets from the state reserve, act on the orders of the Government of the Russian Federation to consider the requests of federal agencies of the executive branch of government, the state governing bodies of members of the Russian Federation, and enterprises, institutions, and organizations to borrow or reserve physical assets from the state reserve and to incorporate assets in the state reserve, and present its conclusions to the Government of the Russian Federation;

draft proposals on the procedure for keeping records of supplies of physical assets in the state reserve and of their movement, and submit these proposals to the Government of the Russian Federation;

organize and monitor the accumulation and preservation of physical assets in the mobilization reserve, the observance of storage, renewal, and replacement regulations, the borrowing and reservation of physical assets of the mobilization reserve, and the correspondence of physical assets kept in the mobilization reserve to the approved lists of assets, state standards, and technical requirements;

analyze the consolidated accounting records of subordinate territorial administrations, enterprises, institutions,

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and organizations, oversee bookkeeping and reporting procedures in the state reserve system, take measures to improve this oversight, draft accounting projections, decide the format of bookkeeping records and reports, and issue instructions on the use of accounting forms and on the procedure for compiling reports;

plan, organize, and finance the construction of facilities for production and non-production purposes with state centralized capital investments and other sources of funding, and appraise and approve plans for the construction, enlargement, remodeling, and retooling of the enterprises, institutions, and organizations making up the state reserve system;

submit proposals to the Government of the Russian Federation on the procedure for choosing the locations of enterprises, institutions, organizations, and other facilities of the state reserve system and for building them within the territory of the Russian Federation;

guarantee the safety of the physical assets under its control, improve the work of the departmental militarized guards of enterprises, institutions, and organizations and raise the level of this work, and install fire prevention systems and take other preventive measures to protect facilities from fire;

organize labor safety measures in the state reserve system and guarantee the safety of production units and the environment during the storage of the physical assets of the state reserve;

organize work in the state reserve system in conformity with laws of the Russian Federation to protect classified information and oversee the planning and timely implementation of measures to protect state secrets and prevent information leaks;

organize the fulfillment of mobilization plans and assignments and the completion of other assignments connected with mobilizing preparations and with civil defense in the state reserve system to secure its steady work under extraordinary circumstances;

organize and finance scientific research and experimental design projects in its assigned sphere of activity;

organize the training, retraining, and advanced training of personnel and supervise the training of personnel with a secondary specialized education;

conclude contracts and agreements within the confines of its authority;

arrange for interaction with agencies of the executive branch of government of Russian Federation members and agencies of local self-government;

develop trade-economic and scientific-technical cooperation with foreign countries in conformity with laws of the Russian Federation;

arrange for the establishment of departmental data processing systems and data bases in its areas of activity;

participate in the deliberation of draft standards and changes in standards and oversee the correspondence of goods and materials intended for the state reserve to technical requirements;

arrange for the certification of items to be stored according to the established procedure;

organize and regulate entries in the register of institutions, enterprises, and organizations making up the state reserve system in conjunction with the State Committee of the Russian Federation for the Administration of State Property, and submit proposals to the Government of the Russian Federation on structural improvements in the state reserve system;

perform other functions envisaged in laws of the Russian Federation.

6. The Committee of the Russian Federation for State Reserves will be empowered to do the following:

submit proposals on the development and improvement of the state reserve system to the Government of the Russian Federation for consideration;

make decisions when necessary on matters under its jurisdiction in conjunction with the heads of other federal agencies of the executive branch of government;

oversee the implementation of federal laws, edicts and directives of the President of the Russian Federation, decrees and directives of the Government of the Russian Federation, and departmental legal instruments pertaining to the state reserve;

create, reorganize, and eliminate subordinate territorial administrations, institutions, and organizations;

rescind the instruments of subordinate territorial administrations, enterprises, organizations, and institutions if they are contrary to the Constitution of the Russian Federation, federal laws, edicts and directives of the President of the Russian Federation, and decrees and directives of the Government of the Russian Federation;

conduct audits and verify the existence, quality, and registration of physical assets of the state reserve stored at enterprises and in institutions and organizations (irrespective of their property status and departmental jurisdiction), and issue mandatory orders for the elimination of discovered shortcomings;

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draft instructions on the delivery, acceptance (or incorporation), storage, replacement, and issuance of physical assets of the state reserve and on other operations with these physical assets, which will be binding for their suppliers, the facilities responsible for their storage, and their recipients (or consumers), and approve them according to the established procedure;

conduct foreign economic activity according to the procedure established by laws of the Russian Federation;

use the fees charged for borrowed physical assets, the funds from other economic operations by territorial administrations, enterprises, institutions, and organizations of the committee, the penalties, fines, and forfeits they collect, part of the proceeds from the difference in the prices of physical assets deposited in the state reserve and assets issued from the state reserve, and other receipts, with the exception of funds earmarked for special operations with physical assets of the state reserve, to finance expenditures on the development and maintenance of the state reserve system;

obtain the necessary information from federal agencies of the executive branch of government, agencies of the executive branch of government of Russian Federation members, statistical agencies of Russian Federation members, enterprises, institutions, and organizations for the drafting of proposals on the assortment and amounts of physical assets to be accumulated in the state reserve and their optimal territorial distribution and for the resolution of problems connected with the storage and borrowing of physical assets of the state reserve, as well as reports on deliveries (shipped and stored) of physical assets of the state reserve and their transfer from one storage facility to another;

hear the reports of the administrative personnel of enterprises, institutions, and organizations (irrespective of their property status and departmental jurisdiction) and of superior agencies on the progress of work with state reserves at meetings of the committee collegium;

arrange for the temporary storage of the physical assets of outside enterprises, institutions, and organizations in the available storage facilities of enterprises, institutions, and organizations of the state reserve system on a contractual basis.

7. The Committee of the Russian Federation for State Reserves will be headed by a chairman, to be appointed to this office and removed from it in conformity with laws of the Russian Federation.

The chairman will be responsible for the general supervision of committee activities and personally accountable for the performance of the committee's assigned functions.

The chairman will have deputies, appointed to office and removed from office by the Government of the Russian Federation. The distribution of duties among deputy chairman will be decided by the committee chairman.

8. The chairman of the Committee of the Russian Federation for State Reserves will do the following:

submit draft legislative instruments on matters under the committee's jurisdiction to the Government of the Russian Federation for consideration according to the established procedure;

issue legal instruments (orders, directives, and instructions), binding and applicable throughout the territory of the Russian Federation, on the basis of, and pursuant to, legislative enactments within the confines of the committee's authority;

appoint and dismiss the members of the committee's central staff and the heads of territorial administrations, enterprises, organizations, and institutions subordinate to the committee;

approve the structure and staff roster of the committee's central staff within the confines of authorized staffing and wage limits, and approve the estimate of staff maintenance costs within the confines of authorized allocations;

approve statutes on the structural subdivisions of the committee, as well as statutes on the administrations and organizations subordinate to the committee and enterprise charters according to the established procedure;

nominate outstanding personnel of the state reserve system according to the established procedure, confer their honorary titles, and present state awards of the Russian Federation to them.

9. For the performance of the important functions assigned to the Committee of the Russian Federation for State Reserves, the committee will have a collegium made up of the chairman (who will also be the collegium chairman), his deputies as ex officio members, and other members, including administrators of the committee's structural subdivisions and its territorial administrations and subordinate enterprises, institutions, and organizations.

Collegium members not categorized as ex officio members will be approved by the Government of the Russian Federation on the recommendations of the committee chairman.

The committee will meet regularly to discuss the main aspects of the organization of work with state reserves and the functioning of the state reserve system.

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The decisions of the collegium will be recorded in the minutes of these meetings and usually will be enacted in the orders of the committee chairman.

If there are disagreements between the chairman and the collegium, the chairman will implement his own decisions and report the differences of opinion to the Government of the Russian Federation.

Collegium members will be entitled to report their dissenting opinion to the Government of the Russian Federation.

10. A scientific and technical council made up of scientists and specialists in the state reserve sphere will be established as part of the Committee of the Russian Federation for State Reserves for the pursuit of a single, scientifically sound, technical policy in the state reserve system and the drafting of recommendations on the use and incorporation of scientific and technical achievements and advanced experience in the creation, storage, and use of the state reserve.

Boards of experts and scientific consultants and procedural councils may be set up by the Committee of the Russian Federation for State Reserves to consider proposals on the improvement of the financial and economic mechanism of the state reserve system and improvements in planning, financing, and reporting procedures.

The members of the scientific and technical council and the consulting boards and the statutes on them will be approved by the chairman of the Committee of the Russian Federation for State Reserves.

11. Expenditures on the maintenance of the central staff of the Committee of the Russian Federation for State Reserves will be financed with allocations earmarked for this committee in the federal budget for government administration.

12. The Committee of the Russian Federation for State Reserves will be a legal entity and will have a stamp depicting the state arms of the Russian Federation and its own title, official forms, seals, and stamps, and the requisite bank accounts.

The Committee of the Russian Federation for State Reserves will open special current and foreign currency accounts in banks to handle settlements for items delivered to the state reserve and issued from the state reserve and to finance expenditures on the replenishment of the state reserve and the maintenance of the state reserve system.

Regional Affairs

*Directive on Signing Treaty Delimiting Russia, Sakha Powers

95P50141A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 29 Jun 95 p 4

["Directive of the President of the Russian Federation of 23 Jun 95 No 293-rp"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In accordance with Part 3 Article 11 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation:

1. To sign, on 29 June 1995 in Moscow, the Treaty delimiting the objects of authority and powers between organs of state power of the Russian Federation and organs of state power of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutiya).

2. To confirm the following representatives of the organs of state power of the Russian Federation as signers of the Treaty indicated in point 1 of the current directive:

V.S. Chernomyrdin - Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation

R.G. Abdulatipov - Deputy Chairman of the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly
M.A. Mityukov - First Deputy Chairman of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly
S.A. Filatov - Chief of the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation
N.D. Yegorov - Deputy Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation, Minister for National and Regional Policy Affairs

[Signed] President of the Russian Federation

B. Yeltsin

*RF Economic Measures for North Caucasus Region

954F2596A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 6 Jun 95 p 3

[Decree of Russian Federation Government "On Implementing the Results of the Congress of Representatives of North Caucasus Business Circles" of 24 May 1995, No. 516, Moscow]

[FBIS Translated Text] With a view to implementing the results of the Congress of North Caucasus Business Circles (hereinafter, the Congress) with respect to stabilizing the socioeconomic situation in the North Caucasus region, and proceeding from the special role that the North Caucasus region plays on Russia's southern

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borders and the complexity of the social and ethnic processes occurring in that region, the Russian Federation Government **resolves:**

1. To direct the Russian Federation Ministry for Nationality Affairs and Regional Policy, the Russian Federation Ministry of Finance, the Russian Federation State Committee for Antimonopoly Policy and Support for New Economic Structures, and the Entrepreneurship Support and Competition Development Fund of the Russian Federation State Committee for Antimonopoly Policy and Support for New Economic Structures, in conjunction with executive government bodies of the republics, krays, and oblasts of the North Caucasus region, to provide support to small business, promoting first and foremost the formulation and implementation of regional programs to support small business.

2. To approve the initiative of entrepreneurs of the Republic of North Ossetia, the Ingush Republic, and the Stavropol Kray Administration to establish a regional business center in the city of Stavropol and to recommend the establishment of analogous business centers in other republics, krays, and oblasts of the North Caucasus region.

To take under advisement that the paramount task of such business centers must be to devise and implement, in conjunction with regional entrepreneurship support funds, a regional North Caucasus program to support small business, with a view to stabilizing the socioeconomic situation and improving ethnic relations in the North Caucasus region.

3. To direct the Russian Federation State Property Committee, in conjunction with the Russian Federation Ministry of Economics, the Russian Federation State Committee for Antimonopoly Policy and Support for New Economic Structures, and the Entrepreneurship Support and Competition Development Fund of the Russian Federation State Committee for Antimonopoly Policy and Support for New Economic Structures, to submit proposals in the prescribed procedure for leaving a portion of the proceeds from the privatization of federal property in the North Caucasus region that are subject to transfer to the Entrepreneurship Support and Competition Development Fund of the Russian Federation State Committee for Antimonopoly Policy and Support for New Economic Structures at the disposal of republic, kray, and oblast entrepreneurship support and competition development funds in order to support small businesses in the region that are involved in formulating and implementing the regional North Caucasus program to support small business.

4. To advise executive government bodies of the republics, krays, and oblasts of the North Caucasus region, in conjunction with the Russian Agency for Support for Small and Medium-Sized Business, to review the question of establishing regional agencies for support for small and medium-sized business, the primary objective of which will be to provide support to small business in terms of training, consultation, and the provision of information and expert review services for entrepreneurial projects and programs.

5. To direct the Russian Federation Ministry of Economics and the Russian Federation State Committee for Antimonopoly Policy and Support for New Economic Structures to provide incentives for small business in the North Caucasus region in the draft federal targeted program for support for small business in the Russian Federation in 1996-1997 and to coordinate these incentives with the regional North Caucasus program to support small business.

6. To advise the Russian Federation Central Bank to submit, within 90 days, proposals for improving credit and financial policy in the North Caucasus region.

7. To direct the Russian Federation State Customs Committee to consider the Congress's proposals with respect to establishing a single customs fee space and, if necessary, to draw up proposals for amending the Russian Federation Customs Code.

[Signed] V. Chernomyrdin, chairman of the Russian Federation Government

*Radioactive Waste Linked to Murmansk Oblast Deformities, Morbidity

95WN0201A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 23 Jun 95 p 5

[Article prepared by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA investigative service: "Children of the Nuclear Carnival; Medical Statistics Show Infant Mortality in Murmansk Oblast Increased by 18 Percent in Recent Years"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

[Begin boxed material]

Report on the Status of Technical Means of Recharging Reactors and Treatment of Radioactive Waste.

(Northern Fleet)

...Storage facilities for nuclear fuel and radioactive waste do not meet the requirements for ensuring nuclear and radiation safety. The most important facilities (BTB)—storhouses for nuclear fuel, have been taken out of operation due to design imperfections.

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...The current temporary structures do not meet the needs of the fleet for storage of nuclear fuel for provision of regularly scheduled refuelling of reactors and discharge of spent fuel. The BTB do not have technical structures to ensure the operation of the transport-packaging complement TUK...

[End boxed material]

Three-year old Olya quickly dashed around the room, playing soccer, smiling like a photo model, and skillfully tying the kerchief on her head, not a bit embarrassed by the camera lens. And, although she was not doing anything special, here they view Olya as a star of the first magnitude. The fact that she has been missing one arm and both legs since birth does not count.

Olya Lopukh is the only one of 62 wards of the Murmansk Specialized Children's Home who clearly understands all that is going on around her. All the others, along with their physical defects, also suffer from congenital mental retardation.

"I will not hazard to say whether this is from radiation or not," says the chief physician of the children's home, Lyubov Anastasyeva. "No one has undertaken any special studies. Before we used to get, as a rule, children with cerebral palsy and 'Sunday's children,' but since the beginning of the 90's we have been getting a wave of 'Down's syndrome.' And thousands of such babies remain with their families."

Yet the electronic display on one of the Murmansk streets demonstrates unfailing calm. The figure of 6 micro-roengtens which has remained unchanged over the last 10 years assures passers-by that the level of radiation in the city is lower than the natural level. However, no one needs to be convinced of this—they have long ago stopped paying attention to the display.

There are many points where nuclear vessels of the RF [Russian Federation] Northern Fleet are stationed in Murmansk Oblast: Gremikha, Gadzhiyeva, Polyarnyy, Vidyayevo, the Olenya inlet, Nerpichya, Saida-inlet and Western Litsa.

Therefore, Murmansk Oblast occupies first place in the world in the number of nuclear reactors per unit of area. And the total number of radioactive sources submerged in the seas which wash the oblast from three sides comprise two-thirds of the activity of all the waste buried in the World Ocean.

Yet the reports by the head of the Main Technical Administration of the Military-Naval Fleet of Russia, Vice-Admiral V. Topilin, which came into our possession not by accident, testify to an even more ominous situation on dry land.

Altogether on the territory of Murmansk Oblast there are around 8,000 cubic meters of liquid and solid waste being stored, over 25,000 spent heat-emitting assemblies and 5 active zones of submarine reactors with a high level of enrichment.

From the report of Vice-Admiral V. Topilin it also follows that the shore technical bases of the Northern Fleet for storage of radioactive waste and nuclear fuel have become worn and outdated, while the construction of new ones is at a standstill. The storage facilities are overfilled, since all of their lethally dangerous contents have not been removed for processing since Soviet times.

Only 20 percent of the floating technical bases intended for handling fuel are of current construction. The rest are in a catastrophic state. Eighty-four percent of the tankers transporting the waste are in need of urgent repair.

Of the 70 nuclear submarines retired from the complement of the Northern Fleet, 52 have not had the active cores of their reactors removed, and only 9 submarines have been prepared for temporary storage afloat. These are burning figures. As we know, due to the size limitations (PLA [atomic submarines] not AES [nuclear power plants), highly enriched uranium had to be used in the vessel's reactors. Plu[illegible], when the fuel is burned out, plutonium is formed. And so, tens of such little "atomic bombs" are standing at the docks.

Add to this also the more than 80 operating nuclear submarines, on which, according to foreign sources, there have been around 40 serious accidents and fires since 1961. Murmansk Oblast has long ago turned into a delayed-action atomic bomb. The only question is: When will it go off?

We cannot say that the leadership of the Military-Naval Fleet of Russia is not concerned by this problem. The main question is the absence of money. The estimated cost of utilization of a missile PLA comprises 9 billion rubles (R) in 1994 prices. In order to remove only one echelon of spent nuclear fuel and process it last year cost R2.3 billion. And there are over 100 such echelons which need to be removed.

The information presented in the reports of the Main Technical Administration of the Military-Naval Fleet of Russia is clearly not for open publication. But those officers who helped us to obtain it do not experience any spy-mania. And where would they get a sense of patriotism, if the officers working on handling the nuclear fuel have only one privilege—one year of service is counted as two. As the military men themselves joke, it is so they do not have time to die before reaching their pension. We might add, in no

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country in the world except ours do the armed forces engage in problems of handling nuclear waste, so as not to become distracted from their primary combat tasks. The profession of nuclear waste collector must be a civilian one.

***Construction of Kola AES-2 Planned**

954F2660A Murmansk MURMANSKIY VESTNIK in Russian 23 May 95 p 1

[Article by N. Krol under the rubric "Economics": "Every Little Bit Helps the Oblast—the KAES-2"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A conference was held in the oblast administration where the topic was financing of the design and construction of the Kola AES-2. Taking part in the work were the head of the administration, Yevgeniy Komarov, the Russian Federation deputy minister of atomic energy, Yevgeniy Reshetnikov, the vice president of the Rosenergoatom [Russian Atomic Energy] concern, Yevgeniy Ignatenko, the deputy chief engineer of the AES-2, Vladimir Shmidt, and the directors of the St. Petersburg Atomenergoproyekt [Atomic Energy Planning] Institute and the Russian Academy of Sciences [RAN] KNTs [Kola Scientific Center] Institute of Physical-Technical Problems of Power Engineering of the North, as well as associates of the administration and managers of the oblast's largest enterprises.

Of the four energy units presently in operation, according to the plan the two which are slightly older should be shut down in the year 2004. And so construction of replacement capacities must begin right now. Nine years is a sufficient period of time to do all the work and bring the object on line. Postponing construction means to a large degree putting the future of oblast industry into question. Expectations of obtaining capital from the Ministry of Economics were not realized, according to the governor. The only solution to the situation which has taken shape is to create an energy investment fund.

The decree to form the open-type joint stock company [AOOT] "Energy Investment Fund of Murmansk Oblast" was signed by Yevgeniy Komarov back in December 1994. At the latest conference, the proposal was made to all those present to give a final statement on their readiness (or unwillingness) to become its founders and to give an evaluation of the company's draft charter.

A 2-hour debate followed the talk by the director of the RAN KNTs Institute of Physical-Technical Problems of Power Engineering of the North, Vladislav Blokhin. Although most of the opinions were in favor of organization and formation of the fund, doubts were also heard: Why build energy units and spend enormous amounts of capital on them if a policy to save energy resources is being followed and a course to reduce energy expenditures has been set?

The Russian Federation deputy minister of atomic energy, Yevgeniy Reshetnikov, directed the attention of those assembled to the idea that similar objects are being constructed in other countries using state credits. Organization of an energy investment fund (there are no such financial institutions in Russia at the present time) would really make it possible to attract the attention of governmental circles to the problem, and hence, to figure on major financial support.

One-hundred billion rubles will be needed for construction already in 1995. Yevgeniy Ignatenko told about the financial capabilities of the Rosenergoatom concern. The opinion that the considerable sums of money needed for construction can be obtained from the user's fee of the Russian joint stock company [RAO] "Unified Energy Systems of Russia" (the RAO YeES Rossii) was also heard.

And representatives of science and managers of the oblast's major energy-intensive enterprises, the potential members of the investment fund (there are 21 participants on the founders' list), agreed with the opinion that construction of energy units and creation of the fund are real necessities. It was decided to study the draft charter, which seemed "raw" to them, in detail, prepare concrete proposals, and meet to finish working on this document in a month. In the speakers' opinion, the fund's objectives as well as the stockholders' rights must be more clearly formulated in the document.

***Voronezh, Nizhniy Novgorod Living Standards Compared**

954F2660B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Jun 95 p 5

[Article by Valeriy Konovalov under the rubric "Regional News": "Where in Russia To Live Well, Normally, Poorly, and Miserably"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Voronezh

The rumors are heard throughout Russia—bread is twice as cheap in Voronezh as in Moscow. And you also hear people saying that to buy things, you have to go to Nizhniy Novgorod. But what is behind this idle talk?

Take, for example, Voronezh and its environs, which are shut off from the rest of the Russian world by a solid wall of local administrative bans and restrictions. To judge from statistical data on the cost of the consumer basket, life there is fairly good. The notorious set of 19

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food products costs slightly more than 127,000 rubles [R] in the Voronezh area—one of the cheapest places in the country (this set costs R219,000 in Moscow, for example). But after all, the average wage of Voronezh residents is barely half the average level for the country. And where are the earnings supposed to come from if most of the enterprises here cannot adapt to the market at all? With two or three exceptions, there are periodic production shutdowns and reductions caused by them everywhere, and then because of that, reductions in personnel, failure to pay wages, and a sense of life's hopelessness...

Teachers have not been paid since April, and other budget workers also regularly go without pay for 2-3 months. The celebrated design bureau Khimavtomatika, a participant in all spaceship launches at Baykonur, has been unable to pay wages to its associates for over 3 months. On the other hand, many Voronezh pensioners consider themselves privileged as compared to other colleagues in the country. After all, the administration maintains price levels in the city that fit their capabilities.

Go into a grocery store here and you will see prices which are already forgotten in our Moscow. Bread, for example, costs R800 for a loaf of black bread and R1,000 for a long loaf of white. Sugar costs R2,300 a kilogram, but that is after the jump in price which just occurred, while it used to be only R1,800, sour cream costs R7,000 a kilogram, and so on and so forth.

But do not be in a hurry to dash to Voronezh to replenish your stocks cheaply. Only 1.5 kilograms of sugar a month per person can be bought here, and then only when that person has a Voronezh residence permit, while only half a liter of cheap sunflower oil per person every 2 months can be bought, and so forth. Yes indeed, the coupons and ration cards which are already almost forgotten by our capital residents are in use here. So you will not exactly live it up here, but then you certainly will not die of hunger.

Such a situation, where you are fed at their discretion rather than what you need, does not make people particularly happy, of course. Especially since there is not such a large choice for the local population in terms of sources of food and well-being altogether. Besides two successful enterprises, there is private business, of course. But it is not so easy for everyone in Voronezh to engage in it. Too many things are under the administration's control here. Governor Aleksandr Kovalev, a former plant director, manages the oblast like some enterprise. He sets his own rules of the game, that is to say, of life, for the people in his region. He sets, for example, the minimal price levels for the basic foodstuffs. It seemed to be good for the buyers. But this in no way stimulates local food producers. Subsidies from the local budget do not compensate for expenditures to produce the products, and it is practically impossible to bring the food in from outside the oblast's borders because of the ban imposed by Kovalev himself. That is where the disruptions of supplies and the need to set norms come from. And this when more than 40 percent of the population in Voronezh is below the poverty line.

Here is yesterday's situation. Eggs disappeared in the city. In stores and in the market. There are enormous lines in the few places where they are sold. The reason is understandable: the rumor that the governor is changing prices for this product. The rumor is not without grounds. But the buyer in Voronezh is prepared for any surprise, since a great deal related to price setting here is determined from above.

It is therefore curious that the natural irritation of Voronezh residents at their life is directed not so much at the local as at the federal authorities, in particular the president. In my opinion, Voronezh could be the national champion for number of anti-Yeltsin slogans on the walls, fences, and so forth. But the attitude toward Kovalev here is not pious but not hostile either; he is treated just like all the rest, a hostage to the erroneous federal policy. The most prevalent evaluation is that he is not a great politician and manager, of course, but he tries.

It may seem strange but the complications in his personal life increased the governor's reputation among the people. At a fairly elderly age, he left his family and apartment in a prestigious building recently and began a new life with a young wife. However, I must say that he moved to an even more prestigious apartment with his new wife. But this is what people say about that: "It used to be he would have been expelled from the party for that, but now, nothing, he is still on the job." There is a hint of approval in this evaluation. And Kovalev himself adds new tones to the image of being "his own man," regularly appearing on television and demonstrating numerous weaknesses, at times offended by newspapers, including ours, and at times permitting himself strong statements on other matters.

Our general lack of information on the quality of life in other regions perhaps supports Voronezh residents' sympathy for their governor too. The myth that life in the much-vaunted market-based Nizhniy Novgorod province is harsh and terribly expensive is strong in Voronezh, for example.

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Nizhniy Novgorod

However, the Nizhniy Novgorodians themselves for the most part do not envy Voronezh residents, just as they do not envy the inhabitants of other regions, including the neighboring regions. The Nizhniy Novgorodians have their own pride today, although there are considerable problems. But here is an indicator. The governor here, Boris Nemtsov, inevitably holds the lead in local ratings. His popularity among residents is stable. True, his lead over the local oppositionist persecutors has decreased somewhat recently, but Nizhniy Novgorod sociologists are convinced that the governor's recent sensational duel with Zhirinovskiy on Aleksandr Lyubimov's broadcast, which ended in a complete moral victory for Nemtsov, will again ensure a rise in the Nizhniy Novgorod leader's popularity.

Zhirinovskiy lied when he spoke of the low standard of living in the province. Life there is more dynamic and optimistic than in many regions of Russia. The abundance of goods will rival the capital's. There is a wide range of prices, although they are more accessible than in a great many regions, including neighboring ones or even as compared with the capital.

Here are Nizhniy's prices yesterday in stores and in markets, which are virtually the same here. A loaf of black bread cost R1,000, a long loaf of white—R1,300, cheese—from R18,000 to R20,000 a kilogram, polony sausages—R18,000, smoked sausage—slightly over R30,000, milk—R1,300 per liter package, cheese curds—R1,300 for a 250-gram package, new potatoes—R7,000 a kilogram, tomatoes—R8,000, cabbage—R4,000, bananas—R5,500, and cucumbers—R2,500-R3,000 a kilogram. And they have everything that, say, Moscow has. And one cannot imagine disruptions in supplies of particular food products here, since merchants and entrepreneurs willing to fill the gaps are standing ready.

Indeed, purchasing power here is much higher than in Voronezh. There are no precise statistics. However, according to local experts' evaluations, Nizhniy Novgorodians' level of entrepreneurial activism is roughly 20 percent higher than in the country as a whole. That is to say, people here earn money much more actively than the average Russian citizen, among them Voronezh residents.

People come to buy and to sell goods in Nizhniy, since turnover is faster here. It is curious that local conflicts and clashes involve above all the organization of trade, which in itself attests to its vitality. Here is one of the intrigues developing here these days. A place was allotted for private trade in the center of the city, on Alekseyev Street. Merchants took it over in a matter of hours. And then the city authorities suddenly realized their mistake, figuring that it would be more profitable to set up a parking lot here. But there was no turning back. The merchants and customers picketed and organized a protest march and the authorities backed down.

Here is another story: by governor's directive, a free economic zone for entrepreneurs was set up on the base of three defense plants where the workers recently have been getting no more than R50,000 a month. Various privileges are envisioned for entrepreneurs and there are new opportunities for production capacities and people. True, the oblast procurator's office protested this decision. The dispute continues. And a lot of people are interested in its outcome. People here do not expect an increase in norms for food ration cards, they expect an increase in their opportunities to earn money.

And for Nizhniy Novgorod peasants there are no restrictions on exporting products, although the most desirable market for them is the local one, since it is more developed and more reliably guaranteed. It is for precisely that reason that local products dominate in Nizhniy Novgorod and other cities in the region. It is for precisely that reason that the most successful farmers in Russia are Nizhniy Novgorod farmers, who are also taking over the financing of local sociocultural and domestic activities and pensioners. And that represents an insoluble problem for Voronezh Oblast, and in fact for most other regions of the country.

'Right Bank' Opposition Movement Formed

954F2603A Nizhniy Novgorod NIZHEGORODSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 18 May 95 p 1

[Open letter: "The 'Right Bank' Public Movement Appeals to the People of Nizhniy Novgorod"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Friends, ladies and gentlemen!

The Russian land is great and abundant, but there is no order in it.

Why? What gave rise everywhere to chaos and arbitrariness, wild behavior, and confusion? There was a time when everyone searching for salvation rushed to get under Russia's great-power wing — "every tongue existing in it." And no one was refused Russia's protection, charity, or support. The attitude taken by Russia to everyone — whether he be a Tungus or a Kalmyk, a Kyrgyz or an Osetinian — was as though he was her own son, and she shared her bread and songs with him with a mother's generosity. Everyone had a place in the sun. And among the nations inhabiting Russia, there was no dissension or interethnic enmity.

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Today Russia is being deserted by those who owe to Russia their own state system, their unique culture, and their self-awareness.

What is happening in our poor Homeland?

It is no simple matter to explain everything that is occurring. To the misfortune and dissatisfaction of millions, one of the most sorrowful and tragic pages in the history of Russia has fallen to our lot. A once mighty country has proven to be on the brink of economic collapse because those who have come to power do not have a firm and definite socioeconomic policy that conforms to the nation's interests. Everywhere that one looks, there is a bazaar of worldly vanity, hubbub, discordance, and idle talk. While power exists, there is the sense of complete lack of power. There is nothing that is solid, stable, or reliable. In our chaotic and senseless haste, without noticing the precise orientation markers, we rush around randomly, no one knows where. Where is the truth and justice that people need so much? Where is genuine state reason, the regulator of everything that exists? Only one thing is clear: there is no path backward. The only things behind us are ruins and the burnt ashes of the edifice of the Soviet state system, an edifice that took decades to create. And although Russia is a country of maximums and of maximalists, there is nothing left to destroy.

Very rich Russia, before the eyes of the entire planet, is turning into a decrepit beggar-woman. "Just a bit more, just a tiny bit more," and it will probably be possible to see her with her knees bent and finally broken. It is humiliating and shameful to see Russia begging foreign bankers for pitiful credit, and at the same time, every month, as much as $1.5 billion is being taken out of the country.

Everything is splitting at the seams, degrading, and falling apart — the system of public education and public health, science and culture, literature and art. The growing class of Russian entrepreneurs and individual farmers has been oppressed by unbearable taxes, by exorbitant credit, and by the complete indifference of the powers that be to their fate.

That is the path of the "reforms and *perestroika*" along which our trusting and patient nation has been led by the Russian government and parliament, operating on orders of and under the dictation of Western capital.

The interests of the West are also zealously defended by the mass media. The sweet-tongued cream-skimmers worked hard to make sure that, in the thousand-year history of Russia, there does not remain a single bright spot, a single good deed committed by our ancestors, that could serve as an object to be imitated for the young generation or that could evoke the justified pride of our contemporaries. Everything was subjected to abuse and censure. Everything was bemoaned and spat upon, and even the nation's sacred objects have had a loathsome cover thrown onto them: they have been profaned and dishonored. Our detractors are going all out, using all kinds of abusive language, and mocking us in order to suggest to the world that "the beam of enlightenment has not yet illuminated the concepts of our wild men," while equating present-day Russia with caveman Russia — the unwashed Russia of bast-shoes. Russian people have begun to be ashamed of the open manifestation of their patriotic feelings or the love of their Homeland. If they do so, people will ascribe anything to them without a twinge of conscience — national chauvinism, fascism, or God knows what other rubbish. Everyone, from the highest to the lowest, is being subjected to the corrupting influence of an ideology that is alien to us.

Another source of serious chagrin is the fact that the people who are reigning — and we specifically mean reigning, rather than governing — on the vast expanses of Russia are the newly arrived "democrats," the victors who have established in the country a new form of governing: the democratic dictatorship. A dictatorship of an individual handful of people over the entire nation. Just as in 1917, the country is being robbed shamelessly. Everything that is educated, alive, honest, and freedom-loving is being destroyed. The forces that have come to the throne are lawlessness, illegality, senseless anarchy, and criminal provocation against one's own people.

The government of Russia long ago lost not only its economic independence, but also political. And the Western emissaries did not delay in taking advantage of that. Herds of them rushed toward us "in order to catch good fortune and high ranks," extracting for themselves considerable profits from the situation that was being created. One of the goals set by them, and the most substantial one, is land reform in Russia. They are completely aware that, by the end of the twentieth century, the value of one hectare of plowland, according to UNESCO computations, will exceed the value of any minerals located within its confines. And since "Russia's potential is considered to be the largest in the world and the prospected reserves of raw materials are estimated to have a value of $28.5 trillion, while the forecasted resources are valued at $140 trillion," they will fall in battle, but they will not lose even a minuscule chance of staking out even a 100,000 hectares of our land. For a beginning. Not by chance, the developers of the reforms (the International Finance Corporation) included Russia among the Third World countries and, rendering us the "honor," put us in the same category as Ethiopia, Nigeria, Namibia, etc. It is easy and convenient to use

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this measuring stick to cut up the Russian land at their discretion in order to form a land market.

But why do we allow anyone from the outside to "worry" about us and unceremoniously take charge of our fate? Are we no longer the masters in our own home? Or has Russia lost some of its strength of spirit and good?

In order to prevent Russian civilization from being consigned to oblivion, it is necessary for us to begin immediately the creative process ourselves.

But who will assume the very heavy burden? Who will be able not to break down at the very beginning of the bumpy road? Are there among us any bold, noble, and unselfish builders of the new Russia?

We, the participants in "Right Bank," a public movement for the growth of the civic society, are answering these questions with exhaustive completeness. There do exist on the Russian land people who have been endowed with talents and with a reasonable and quick mind. They are pure of heart and are true to their principles. Russia's pain has become their own, and they know precisely what has to be done in order to put the country on the path of legality, calm, and order. They include representatives of various professions and philosophies, various religious denominations, political convictions, and passions. But we are all united by the sacred idea of the rebirth of Russia and its former might and majesty. We have not lost hope and we firmly believe that, on the basis of spiritual and moral values and material prosperity, the goal that we have set is completely attainable.

We completely understand and are completely aware that labor and a developed economy are the source of material blessings, wealth, and sufficiency. We categorically censure the situation and the existing conditions when, right next to a person with a wooden plow, seven people can calmly enrich themselves with a spoon. We feel that no one other than feeble old men and unfortunate orphans, widows with small children, and people with disabilities have the moral right to eat "bread that they have not earned." Everyone is supposed to and is obliged to feed himself by the work of his own hands. And everyone — whether he be a scientist, entrepreneur, teacher, performing artist, politician, or a musician — needs all the opportunities for realizing his capabilities and talents, ideas and plans. The country's wealth creates a country's might. Human intellect and finance capital — let us call things by their real names — are interrelated and interdependent. Their accumulation and development are inconceivable without one another. It is only when fused together that intellect and capital become the masters of all. Without independent domestic capital we shall be turned not only into a raw-materials appendage of Europe and America, but also into a dumping ground for garbage and radioactive waste.

There are multitudes of people like us, but our common misfortune lies in the fact that we are disorganized and are like grains of sand that are carried around the world by the wind. But we shall remember that we are all children of the same mother — Russia. We shall forget the unfounded hostility and insults, if they existed. We shall stop the unnecessary fights, intrigues, and local favoritism. This is not the time to speak in different languages. What we need is a single united force around which to consolidate all the thinking people who treasure the nation's interests and the future of Russia. Through faith, confidence, and trust we appeal to everyone for peace and consent.

We are ready for businesslike cooperation with any public movement, parties, unions, associations, or public groups, without forcing our views or convictions on anyone. Our hearts are open for communication with everyone who is burning with the desire, to use the words of the great Mikhayla Lomonosov, "to apply their sufferings for the overall good of the Homeland.

"We openly announce the changeover to opposition against the oblast leadership and we intend to carry out, by parliamentary methods, an active struggle to nominate our representatives to the power structures of the executive and legislative agencies. Power, money, and worldly glory are, for us, not an end in themselves. We proceed from the single desire, during this difficult hour, to bring benefit to our land and our country, which we call by the proud name that is so dear to us — Russia.

We do not promise any rapid changes for the better. Success in identical degree depends upon everyone and upon each of us. Do not put your hopes on your neighbor. Do not wait apathetically for manna from the heavens. Put your shoulder under the common burden. In order to arrive anywhere, it is necessary to keep walking. It is only the traveler who masters the road. That is why we appeal to you, the dear people of Nizhniy Novgorod, to begin, together with us, to lay the stones into the foundation on which a renewed Russia will stand unshakable and firm.

[Signed] Participants in the "Right Bank" public movement for the growth of civic society

[Editorial note] The program of the "Right Bank" movement is published on page 2.

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